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Abstract

Title of Dissertation: ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC PASSENGER FERRY SAFETY IN KENYA
Degree:

MSc

This dissertation probes in to domestic passenger ferry safety in Kenya. It looks into past
accidents that have occurred, their causes, impacts, investigation and if any lessons were learnt
from them. Also, it reviews the past and current operational system in the Kenya water transport
network by analyzing the passenger vessels, operators, regulators and all stakeholders involved.
This analysis further focusses on sampled ferry accidents and incidents in Mombasa, Kenya.
Passenger vessels, especially domestic passenger ferries have been utilized worldwide to
connect islands and are considered as an efficient means of transport. They have hugely
contributed to reduce time and distance through their operational efficiency by creating shortcuts
between islands.
Kenya has access to both the Indian Ocean and inland waters which include lakes, dams and
rivers. Passenger vessels in Kenya entail ferries, boats and cruise ships calling at the country's
main port. There has been numerous passenger vessel accidents experienced in the country due
to various reasons. In most cases, massive losses have been experienced in these accidents.
This research has applied an appropriate accident causation model to study ferry related
accidents in Kenya and the effect marine casualty investigation has had thereto. It has also sought
to address any gaps that may exist between the operators, the administration and the users.
Human Factor Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships has been used to
present the analysis in this study because it has the additional level of outside factors and also
expounds on unsafe acts, organizational influences, unsafe supervision and preconditions of
unsafe acts which are major areas in relation to the safety of ferries in Kenya. It has provided a
better understanding of ferry safety and how the human element contributes to unsafe situations.
The closing chapter has outlined recommendations that can help in improving ferry safety in the
country.
_____________________________________________________________________
Key words: Ferries, Accident Analysis, Passenger Safety, Marine Casualty Investigation
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ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC PASSENGER FERRY
SAFETY IN KENYA.

1 Introduction
This research addresses domestic passenger ferries in Kenya, their operational system, history
of accidents and incidents, their causes and preparedness that exists currently and the effect of
marine casualty investigations from previous marine casualties. Analysis on passenger ferry
safety has been done using the HFACS-MSS taxonomy to probe into accident causations and
explore guidance on how to eventually achieve passenger ferry safety in Kenya. Human factor
analysis is a multi-disciplinary science that addresses the cognitive and physical behavior of
person(s) and how they function in social, technical and environmental situations. It may involve
the primary operating personnel, deficiencies in management, policies, supervision, maintenance,
and hardware and equipment design (Cushing, 2013). Due to the challenges and constraints of
marine casualty and incident investigations in Kenya, the author has proposed countermeasures
fixated on endowing an independent investigation body in the country whereby marine causalities
and incidents can be efficiently and adequately investigated for the benefit of the nation and IMO
objectives on marine casualty investigations.
Marine casualties refer to the operation of a marine vessel that results into a loss of life, injury or
loss of persons, damage to vessel or to the marine environment, loss of vessel or its
abandonment, grounding or collision. On the other hand, marine incident refers to a series of
events related to the safety of a vessel that occurs and may endanger the safety of a vessel,
persons and environment if not corrected.
1.1

Problem Statement

Even though water transport is ranked among the safest means of transportation in comparison
to road transport, the safety and use of domestic passenger ferries in developing nations still
needs more improvement (Galic, Lucik, & Skoko, 2014). Most developing countries face the
problem of passenger ferry safety and Kenya is not exceptional as observed from the frequency
of recent domestic ferry mishaps.
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In every passenger transport operation, passenger safety is an essential element to be observed
and maintained. Reports and every data pertaining passenger safety, including past accidents,
their full analysis and stipulated recommendations require attention. Sklet (2004) highlighted that
major accidents that lead to a higher number of fatalities still exist even though there has been
more focus in risk assessment in the maritime industry globally. Further he suggested that if
thorough marine casualty investigations could be conducted after every incident, many persons
in the industry would learn and this could further help in averting future accidents. The various
models of accident investigations applied today should be sustainable in order to ensure that the
past mistakes in the ferry industry that have costed lives are not repeated. For a comprehensive
investigation, a marine casualty investigation requires a combination of more than one method
(Sklet, 2004).
According to Schröder (2003) a solid database for marine casualties is lacking in a majority of
developing countries which could help in performing risk assessments for the shipping industry.
In developing nations, once a ferry accident occurs, a few unsustainable measures are taken and
a plain investigation and recommendation is given. (Fatoumatta, 2015). Seldom will a simple
judgement by an expert be utilized if there is no history of marine casualty data. This calls for the
need to have knowledge about what can be done to overcome the deficiencies facing marine
casualty investigations. In addition, Schröder (2003), and Fatoumatta, (2015) pointed out that it
is the mandate of the investigation body that determines the focus of an investigation and as such
the model to be used during the investigation.
When ferry accidents occur in developing nations, the poor people are affected most because it
is the majority who use the ferries and boats. Limited preventive measures have been put in place
to act as measures against these accidents which are recurring. The sector seems to fall into a
vicious cycle because of the very many sub-standard vessels operating in the public and private
sectors. Improvement of the passenger ferry sector needs to be prioritized in terms of design,
construction, survey, investigation, competence, just to mention but a few, in order to make the
ferry sector safe in the country. A look at the ever overcrowded vessels at the Likoni Channel
sends signals of a looming disaster in waiting. One can ask, what is the maritime administration
doing about it? A probe on what policies they have formulated in this regard and the regulations
enforced is necessary. According to Lawson et al. (2005), technology, standards and procedures
of inspection, certification, Search and Rescue (SAR) services, training, reporting and analysis,
and even more important the involvement of both the private and public sectors can contribute
towards continuous improvement.
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Varying standards, regulations and policies on professional marine casualty investigation, as well
as different methods of assessing the investigators proficiency and competence, result in an
inconsistent system for safe operations in the marine transport industry (Galic et al., 2014).
Therefore with this in mind, the safety of ferries in Kenya cannot be ignored. Although the IMO is
not responsible for such kinds of ships, they are of importance for any multi-modal transport
system and play a vital role in contributing to a nation’s growth within a global economy. Due to
these difficulties, this study will hence analyse the impact of passenger vessel safety with view
from the ship-owners and the services they provide, the maritime administrations regulation
capability and its accident investigation quality.
1.2

Background of the Study

The safety of maritime transportation is an establishment reliant on measures considered to have
the capacity to protect human life, materials and non-material property affiliated directly or
indirectly to marine transport. Safety at sea is a fundamental component that can be broken down
into to the following; institutions bringing legal regulations, those in charge of the implementing
and overseeing safety measures and standards, legal instruments related to safety at sea and
international maritime conventions, and users at sea (Galic et al., 2014).
Accidents involving passenger ferries are common in coastal and inland navigation especially
when necessary maritime safety regulations are not stringently followed and monitored. On the
other hand, domestic passenger ferries are deemed to be one of the most successful types of
transportation operating today with its commercial demand proving its stakeholders and
consumers to be reliant on it in terms of affordable transport of trade and passengers between
islands, (Hannah, 2016). According to Hannah, the use of domestic passenger ferries has been
utilized worldwide as it has connected islands and its operational efficiency contributed to
reducing the distance and operation time by creating shortcuts between these islands. In Kenya,
the same case applies, indeed, statistics indicate that many persons use passenger vessels to
move from one mainland to the island and back. For instance, in Mombasa, from the island
crossing to the Likoni mainland, seven ferries with an approximate carrying capacity of 1500
passengers operate on the channel throughout the year (KFS, 2016). However, while the capacity
is about 1500, the ferries usually carry more than the required capacity due to the limited number
of ferries and increase in population, thereby ignoring and violating safety the rules and
regulations. This is also observed in other water transport areas like Lamu and inland water bodies
like Lake Victoria, Turkana and Baringo.
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The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA), is a government parastatal that was set up in June 2004
with a mandate to regulate and oversee maritime affairs in Kenya's maritime industry. Promoting
maritime safety is one of the administrations core functions. Being the pacesetter of the industry,
the authority has made an effort to strengthen national maritime legislation through enhancing the
regulation and institutional capacities for safety and security of the domestic fleet. This has
created the effective implementation of international maritime conventions and other necessary
instruments on safety and security into the national law for the safety of domestic ships. The
maritime administration, among other functions, coordinates search and rescue, promotes the
preservation of the marine environment, prevents marine pollution, trade facilitation and maritime
investments and supports maritime education and training (KMA, 2008).
1.3

Objectives

Following the background information mentioned above, this dissertation attempts to probe into
ferry accidents in Kenya. In addition to having a more specified goal, this dissertation will analyse
the causes of ferry accidents and their impacts, and identify the gaps existing in marine casualty
investigation as well as the mitigation of these accidents including, but not limited to the following
topics:
1. To analyse passenger ferry accidents in Kenya by using an accident analysis taxonomy,
Human Factors Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships (HFACSMSS)
2. To identify and rank causes of accidents and incidents involving ferries.
3. To ascertain the current situation of marine casualty and accident investigation in Kenya.
4. To comprehend the marine casualties involved in passenger ferries, the related
challenges and limitations aiming to identify key areas for improvement and provide
specific practical recommendations.
1.4

Scope and Research Methodology

This dissertation does not endeavour to showcase all the information and issues involving ferry
operations and safety in Kenya. The scope of this dissertation focuses on analysing some
selected typical accidents as they have previously occurred in Kenya using the HFACS – MSS
framework and taxonomy and probe into the marine casualty and accident investigations in the
country. The rationale behind the use of ferries as a category of passenger vessels is due to the
potential hazards facing the ferry transport industry in Kenya and to use them as a case in point
which can be utilized to learn and to reference future incidents and accidents within Kenyan
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waters. In addition to the scope, this dissertation will also analyse any existing gaps in marine
casualty and incident investigations especially in relation to previous marine casualties for future
prevention of similar tragedies.
The main source of information for this dissertation includes the safety regulations for domestic
passenger ferries, the Merchant Shipping Bill (MSB), scientific literature, journals, conference
proceedings, professional research reports, field studies carried out in various countries, other
dissertations, causality reports and articles and where need be, newspaper reports. Put together,
this will demonstrate a comparative picture of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats of the ferry transport industry in Kenya. Besides, lectures from both visiting experts and
resident professors contribute to a major extent towards this write up.
1.5

Significance

This study is significant because it focuses on the vital role of transportation which is important
for the development of any nation. It cuts across the board in Kenya to address the administration,
the seafarers, operators, future researchers and academics, policy makers, stakeholders and the
general public. It seeks to highlight any inefficiencies in the ferry sector and suggests measures
to bring down the negative implications through marine casualty investigations. It is assumed the
research will guide policy makers in decision making concerning the safety of passenger vessels
in the country. It will form an empirical and theoretical framework for further research and
contribute towards knowledge in the subject area thereby filling some gaps in the maritime
literature in Kenya. The public may be enlightened on various causes of marine accidents and
the various marine casualties before, while the stakeholders and operators can look at this
research as a document to review their roles and mandates. Lastly, but rather important, the
recommendations and conclusion will provide new dimensions for safer performance in the ferry
sector in Kenya.
1.6

Structure of the study

Based on the problems in the domestic ferry sector in Kenya briefly introduced above the thesis
should be structured as follows: Chapter I is an introduction to briefly highlight the subject matter, followed by the problem
statement, the motivation behind this research, the objectives intended to be achieved and the
scope and methodology used. Chapter II highlights the literature review on passenger vessel
operations and casualties in Kenya and also looks into the national legal and regulatory
framework and what the nation is doing to promote safety in the ferry industry. In Chapter III the
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methodology to be used is explained while in Chapter IV an analysis of data has been presented
followed by a discussion of the analysis in Chapter V. A summary is given and the conclusions
are stated in Chapter VI and finally the recommendations are proposed in Chapter VII.

6

2 Passenger vessel operations in Kenya.
Every country, both developed and developing, struggles to improve its economy. Kenya is a
nation where water transport, being an important means of connectivity both internationally and
locally, remains to be a very vital means of transport. Various passenger vessels allow for the
movement of people within the country and overseas. Internationally, cruise ships and large
vessels are used to facilitate movement. The port currently has two dedicated passenger berths
for cruise vessels calling at Kenya (WPS, 2015-2016). Cruise ships call at the Port of Mombasa,
mostly ferrying tourists to the country, for economic advancement. According to Interferry (2017),
a ferry can be defined as any vessel used to transport passengers and/or vehicles on water in a
definite route in a frequent and regular basis and can range from small boats to large sea-going
ships.
Locally, domestic passenger ferries, speed boats and medium boats are being used. In the inland
waters, boats are used to ferry passengers. In the coastal region largely served by the Indian
Ocean and rivers, speed boats, boats and domestic ferries are the main passenger vessels.
Hannah (2016), notes that domestic passenger ferries contribute towards the nation’s economy
through transport more so when the geographical nature of the country dictates for multimodal
approach to connectivity for business and services to be carried out in order to move goods and
people. Ferries, being the least expensive in the hierarchy of multi-modal transport, make their
demand to be high if they are an option in comparison to other transport means. This chapter
presents further general information about ferry operations, accidents and a description of their
causes and impacts.
Domestic passenger ferries in Mombasa are a huge constituent out of all the water transportation
systems. They offer free movement of people between the islands and mainland. They are more
favorable considering the distance passengers could use by road to access the Island making
them the most efficient means of transport. These ferries are regulated by the state and the legal
regulations applying to their operation like construction, registration, operating routes, manning
and all equally relevant legal requirements. More precisely, a “domestic passenger ferry” is
defined to be a vessel on a scheduled route of regular operations that is entitled to transport
passengers in accordance with the schedule (Hannah, 2016). It is a vessel that operates
7

exclusively in national waters of a member state and therefore not governed by international
instruments of the IMO. It is therefore up to the national administration in a member state to define
the standards of the design, equipment, maintenance and operation of these ships. This has
created challenges in a number of IMO states in particular developing countries which are lacking
maritime expertise and a shortage of resources in general.
There are several institutions set up in all these places to govern the domestic ferries with the
main aim of ensuring that ferry accidents do not occur in order to ensure passenger safety. The
Sub-Committee on Radio Communications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR), at its seventh
session (13 to 17 January 2003), agreed on guidance for MRO’s prepared by the joint ICAO/IMO
working group on harmonization of aeronautical and maritime SAR at its ninth session to assist
member governments in preparing for, and coordinating aspects of major incidents involving
passenger vessel accidents and the rescue of large numbers of persons in distress from vessels
and in working with companies that operate large passenger ships and aircraft to ensure that they
are prepared to effectively support such rescue efforts (IMO, 2003). However, only moderate
progress has been achieved and many accidents on domestic ferries are still reported in many
countries.
Similarly, SOLAS 74, Chapter I, Regulation 21 requires all IMO member states that are party to
the convention to undertake and conduct investigation into any casualty occurring to its vessels
when it judges that the investigation may assist in bringing changes to the present regulations
and supply with the pertinent findings of the investigations. As per the IMO MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.4
a report is required so that the final version of the marine safety investigation together with
particular marine casualty data is prepared and entered into the Global Integrated Shipping
Information System (GISIS) for the marine casualties and incidents module (Fatoumatta, 2015).
The same is stipulated in Article 23 of the Load line convention. The MARPOL 73/78 convention
in Articles 8 and 12 also probes into supplying IMO with relevant information if the vessel causes
an effect on the marine environment. The STCW 78, as amended, requires reports of any
incompetency or act of omission that may cause threat to life or property at sea. However, these
requirements only apply to ships covered by the international instruments of the IMO. Domestic
ferries as explained above, do not fall into this category. As a result, valuable information on the
safety risks involved in the operation of these ships may not be available to an extent as this
would be desirable in view of the relatively high accident numbers in many IMO member states.
However, with the maritime administration in place, it easier to incorporate into the national law
similar regulations for the domestic fleet.
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Kenya in performing its flag and port state obligations and as an IMO member state that has
ratified these conventions, is required to conduct casualty investigations and supply IMO with the
findings on accidents involving its fleet. The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA), as the maritime
administrator since June 2006, needs to incorporate a mass rescue plan into the existing national
SAR plan and also develop a passenger ship safety plan as per the IMO requirements. This can
be cascaded down to the domestic ferries which are not covered by these requirements.
KMA was established through an act of parliament, KMA Act 2006. This Act gives KMA among
other functions undertaking and coordinating research, investigations and survey in the maritime
industry in Kenya (Kenya Gazette, 2006). Therefore, the organization is mandated to oversee the
safety and security functions in Kenya’s Search and Rescue Region (SRR), where among others
passenger ferries operate. The Authority has role to coordinate other relevant entities in case of
an accident or incident involving passenger vessels. Moreover, the Kenya Ferry Service (KFS)
was formed to oversee all ferry operations. They are mandated to ensure passenger safety in the
ferries, maintenance of these ferries, and sensitization to passengers on all aspects involved in
passenger ferries including accident preparedness and rescue operations. Thus the gap on mass
rescue capability in Kenya exists and therefore this research also addresses this problem.
2.1

The Kenya Ferry Services

KFS is a government company that was established through the Kenya law of Companies Act
(CAP 486) and operated under the Transport and Infrastructure Ministry for the purpose of
operating the state ferries. The company’s headquarters operate from Mombasa. According to
the history available at KFS, the Likoni channel ferry services in Mombasa began in 1937. To
date, the ferries remain operational and create the only link to the southern part of the Kenyan
coast. Being situated at the entrance into the Kilindini harbour, their operations remain of utmost
importance as a link that serves not only locals heading to the south coast but also commuters
traversing to Tanzania and beyond.
Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) was bestowed responsibility by the Government, of running the ferry
services with its operations beginning on 1st November 1989. Following that, in 1990 the
government bought four new ferries namely MV Kilindini, MV Nyayo, MV Harambee and MV
Mtongwe II to supplement the existing fleet (KFS 2016). In 1998 the government formalized the
ownership of the Kenya Ferry Services through a National Assembly Sessional Paper No.3 of the
same year, by transforming the contributions of both the government and KPA into equity. The
company (KFS) is now owned 80% by the government and 20% by KPA (Kenya Gazette 1998).
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Currently in the Likoni Channel, there are seven passenger ferries that transport passengers,
goods and vehicles between the island and the mainland leading to South Coast. In Lamu where
a bigger port is coming up, the only means of commuting to the surrounding islands is by use of
passenger ferries and boats most of which are privately owned. The population of passenger
vessels in the Lamu area is much higher than any other region in Kenya due to the reason that
they are the major means of transport in the vast surrounding number of islands. In Lake Victoria,
there is likewise quite a large number of passenger vessels ferrying people from either one island
to the mainland or vice versa.
The busiest ferry services in Kenya are offered by KFS which was commissioned by Government
of Kenya to specifically ferry people and vehicles across the Likoni channel connecting the
mainland and the Mombasa Island due to the capacity of passengers it handles per given day.
Data available shows that it ferries over 300,000 pedestrians and more than 6,000 vehicles daily
across the channel (KFS 2016). There is a trend of growth especially from passengers which is
likely to reach 500,000 by 2019 to 2020 assuming that prevailing trends continue. Although most
are older vessels operating in the Likoni channel, the current ferries actively operating the services
include MF Jambo, MV Nyayo, MV Harambee, MV Kilindini, MV Likoni, MV Kwale, MV Pwani and
MV Mvita.

Figure 2-1: Passenger vessel in Likoni channel
Source: Kenya Ferry Services
KFS’s facilities are categorised as port facility because it runs within the approach to Kilindini
harbour and therefore is expected to be ISPS compliant. KMA as the enforcement agency
assesses and certifies the security plan after every four year period as per ISPS Code
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requirements. There are regular improvements to safety measures at KFS done through the
training and upgrading of safety procedures to the public and ferry personnel.
The ferries are equipped with fire-fighting equipment as well as lifesaving appliances. The
operation of seven lager capacity flat-bottomed ferries guarantees stability. Major improvements
to controls have been put in place at the Likoni passenger ferry terminus; this includes an
improved passenger waiting bay, enhanced exits leading to the public bus terminus, enhanced
and well-lit staircases to avoid injury and slipping, a lane for persons with disabilities at both the
mainland and Island side, an improved passenger walking bay with measured loading control
space, uniformed and plain clothes police patrols on board and at the passenger piers to ensure
order, control and security (KFS 2016).
2.2

Passenger vessel accidents history

The first major ferry disaster to hit Kenya as a nation occurred on 19th April, 1994 when the ferry
MV Mtongwe I, then operating at the Mombasa Island to Mtongwe in the Likoni Channel, capsized
and sank with nearly 400 passengers on board (Daily Nation, 1994).

Figure 2-2: MV Mtongwe I - 1994
Source: Daily Nation. Copyright1994
Out of the approximately 400 people on board, at least 270 died. About 70 people aboard survived
by swimming ashore or clinging to the few life aids on the ferry. It took a long time for rescuers to
arrive at the scene of the accident as SAR services in Kenya regarding marine accidents were
not well in place and relied heavily on the rescue by the Kenya Navy. Following the accident, it
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was reported that the vessel capacity was 300 persons, way below what it was carrying (Daily
Nation, 1994). Even after this accident, and considering its magnitude, documented reports on
the investigation into the cause of the accident cannot be found apart from newspaper reports.
According to a report in the Herald (1994), MV Mtongwe I was a vessel designed with a carrying
capacity of 300 persons but often operated with more on board and had always made it safely
across the channel connecting the Mombasa Island and the South coast in Mtongwe Likoni area.
On the fateful day there were many more passengers on board that needed to urgently cross over
the channel and were taken on board. While only 40 metres away from the Mtongwe shoreline in
the South coast, Likoni, the ferry capsized while being steered toward the mainland. A probe into
the accident by a commission set up did not apportion the blame but later on the Kenya ferry
services and the Kenya Ports Authority accepted liability, where an agreement was reached on
the liability of the accident in the sense that the deceased boarded the ferry knowing that it was
overloaded. Therefore, they were 30 percent liable and the two authorities accepted 70 percent
liability (Daily Nation, 2003)
After the accident, the SAR mission was very difficult. According to the Daily Nation newspaper
(1994), the sea disaster was difficult to handle because the sunken vessel, Mtongwe 1, was partly
buried in the sand.
Other accidents have also occurred at the coastal waters, especially at the Likoni ferry path. The
channel is the main entrance for all vessels entering Kilindini harbour, meanwhile ferries are the
main means of transport, connecting the Mombasa Island to the mainland across the Indian
Ocean. The high number of ferry associated accidents that are experienced in the channel are
attributed to mechanical failure, grounding, man overboard, and rough weather related incidents
and rarely there can occur collisions. Other accidents that have occurred in the recent past include
vehicle overboard or vehicle losing control while descending the ramps and ended up in the sea
or some of the ferries overshooting the ramps. To monitor safety in the channel, a VTS service is
offered by the KPA to ensure all vessels are safe.
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Figure 2-3: Passenger stranded at sea in Likoni Channel
Source: Daily Nation. Copyright 2008
These was a near disaster at the Likoni Channel when the vessel developed mechanical problems
and was pushed by strong winds towards the deep sea. Anxious commuters were waiting to cross
the Indian Ocean at Likoni after the ferry was secured by another ferry and supported towards
the landing pier after it experienced a mechanical problem with over 1000 passengers in 2008.

Figure 2-4: Passenger vessel MV Nyayo being rescued by tug boat at Likoni - 2015
Source: East Africa Standard Newspaper Copyright 2015

13

On 17th May 2015 the passenger ferry MV Kwale ran aground on a coral rock and veered off its
course while transporting passengers across the Likoni channel. According to records from the
KFS, some passengers were hurt due to commotion during the mishap and most panicked forcing
them to jump off the ferry so that they could swim to the shore. The ferry at the time of the accident
was approximated to be carrying about one thousand passengers. It drifted for about one
kilometer from the position it hit the coral rock. Officers drawn from the KMA, KFS, Kenya Navy
(KN), Kenya Maritime Police and volunteer organizations helped in the rescue exercise and to
secure the vessel (The EAS 2015).
The rescue exercise took about four hours to rescue all the passengers by another ferry MV
Kilindini of similar capacity that took in most of the panic stricken passengers. The report further
indicated that by the time of rescue the passengers were wearing safety life jackets. Several other
vessels from the KN and other rescue boats from rescue partner agencies participated in the
rescue as tasked by the Search Mission Coordinator (SMC) at the RMRCC Mombasa.
2.3

Factors contributing to Ferry Accidents

IMO (1997) identified some particular areas of concern that contributes towards ferry accidents.
In general, the following factors are common to domestic ferry accidents.

2.3.1

Faulty Design and Construction of Vessels

The root to a safe vessel begins at the design stage. Hull form, superstructure, propulsion system
and machinery for stability are all vital elements for a safe vessel. Construction has in most cases
been found the cause of an accident. According to Sakalayen, (2006) some professional forward
idea of modification in the IMO criteria developed for SOLAS vessels. He however reiterates that
this idea seems intended to reduce construction cost but leads to sub-standard vessels. The
vessels hull should be divided into several separate and water tight holds to keep the vessel a
float longer to allow enough time for evacuation (Hannah, 2016). Water tight hatch covers should
be considered as well as automatic steering gears since manual tends to fail quite often in bad
weather.

2.3.2

Overloading and overcrowding

Even though the carrying capacity of a ferry is known, overloading is still done by responsible
operators despite knowing that they are violating the rules. As long as the regulators continue to
fail preventing the operators against carrying passengers and cargo in excess, more accidents
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will still occur. Currently, various technologies that can count individuals exist. Staff can be
informed when the number of individuals who have boarded a vessel has reached the maximum
level. The system uses the concept applied in elevators but may not take into account infants and
hand-held cargo. This weigh sensing device can overcome overloading hurdle by triggering an
alarm when the maximum level is attained and could prevent the vessel from sailing whilst with
an extra load (Rahman & Rosli, 2014).

2.3.3

Maintenance

Passenger vessels may have undetected defects obtained either during their construction or wear
and tear. In addition, the physical aging of vessels may cause accidents. These factors are very
common in the Kenyan passenger vessels. Many of the boats and ferries used in passenger
movement are old and have many defects. Ferries that carry passengers across the Likoni
channel have experienced numerous mechanical issues in the past. It has been even riskier when
they have experienced these problems while ferrying the passengers. The detailed analysis of
some of the incidents are as a result of a power failure, passengers concentrating on one side
and trucks getting in the ferry losing control and hitting ferry rails among others.

2.3.4

Crew Competence

Knowledge, experience and training by the crew plays a significant role in the vessel safety.
Formal training facilities are minimal in developing countries and very expensive for that case.
Therefore, to have a competent work force at times requires the employer to initiate and sponsor
most of the training required. Employee turnover has also contributed to losing qualified crew to
other nations leaving very few trained crew members to man and operate the vessels locally.

2.3.5

Inadequate regulations and enforcement

The failure of regulatory bodies and organizations to continuously monitor the integrity and
accuracy of their regulations and policies can lead to an unsafe regime of passenger vessel
operations. Continuous monitoring, updating, evaluating and implementation of the amended
international regulations into the national regimen will lead to a safety culture and compliance by
the vessel operators.
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2.3.6

Weather

Unsafe weather conditions, rough seas and storms when travelling by water always pose
unavoidable risks. Improving weather information systems and simultaneously making them more
affordable even to small passenger vessel owners in the industry could prevent accidents and
save thousands of lives (Golden & Weisbrod, 2016). On the other hand a culture of timely caution,
safety concern and strong regulation may prevent accidents that can occur due to bad weather.

2.3.7

Stability

According to Sakalayen (2006), overcrowding by passengers on the upper deck tends to reduce
the meta-centric height which puts the vessel in a risky situation similarly, cargo that has not been
professionally stashed has been observed to create an unstable condition. In bad weather, if a
vessel is not stable it is likely to list and eventually capsize.

2.3.8

Low freeboards

Passenger RO-RO vessels are designed in such a way that their cargo access doors are low and
close to the waterline in order to make it easy to load and unload vehicles into the ferries. (IMO,
1997). If the vessel stability is affected and lists it is most likely to ingress water due to the access
threshold being below the waterline.
In addition, Lawson & Weisbrod (2005) examined a probable way to establish safety concern in
ferry operations in developing nations. They looked at the aspect of preventing and responding
by concentrating on vessel design, regulatory approach and sufficiency, and also analyzed post
event culpabilities for ferry safety.
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Table 2-1 Areas of inquiry and prevention function for ferry safety in developing nations.

Source: (Hannah 2016, Lawson & Weisbrod, 2005)
According to Lawson and Weisbrod (2005), for the economic development of many countries,
ferry transport is a significant element because of their principal dependence on them as a means
of transportation for their cargo and passengers. They are a catalyst for the nation’s economic
growth and for job creation. Lawson and Weisbrod (2005) also wrote that ferry transport still
remains imperative to those local communities that highly depend on it even if there were high
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rates of fatalities. Knowing the importance of ferry transport to the communities that use it in
Kenya as their basis for economic development it is demoralizing both economically and socially
due to their safety. Indications from previous accident experiences point out to various factors
that highly contribute to towards their occurrence which include poor maintenance, incompetent
crew capacity and outdated technology for on-board emergency response during distress
emergencies and therefore contributing to a high number of causalities. In addition, a lack of a
mass rescue plan, enough rescue facilities and other shore based emergency response increases
the severity of the consequences thus increasing the number of fatalities. According to TAIC
(2010), there is a need for significant shore-based influence for overall safety on passenger
vessels consequently, safety regulations and the proper maintenance of vessels have been found
to contribute highly towards the safety of passenger vessels. Dalziel et al (2012) identified in their
research repeated causes in ferry casualties as inadequate maintenance and vessel design,
overloading, human error, poor communication, bad weather and unavailable or delayed rescue
response. Poor policies have been stipulated thus compromising passenger vessel safety. Also,
the manner in which the whole operation is carried out, both by parties involved directly and
otherwise, does not guarantee passenger vessel safety.
2.4

External factors

External factors may cause accidents. These factors may either be beyond human control or
otherwise. These include: Bad weather, outdated and inaccurate navigational information, heavy
traffic in port among others. For vessels operating on short distances and on high traffic routes
like the Likoni ferries, ship collision risk seems to be high. Other potential causes are lack of
adherence to the IMO requirement that passenger vessels carrying more than twelve persons on
international routes to comply with the IMO applicable provisions. A collision of a passenger ferry
and other small boats doing fishing within the port area or passenger vessel route is a likely factor
in busy channels.
2.5

Regulations derived from Very serious Casualties

Almost all regulations for passenger vessel transport are derived from accidents, incidents and
near misses. The Herald of Free Enterprise accident, for example, attributed to the development
of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code while the Titanic led to the development of
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention. Nurwahyudy (2014) notes that shipping regulations
include technical design, the construction, operations, repair, training, manning standards, regular
inspections, security and environment impact through the vessels life span. Thorough and

18

adequate inspections should examine in depth the vessels hull condition, performance of the
propulsion system, stability information, electrical system onboard and other machinery, firefighting and prevention systems, lifesaving appliances and their arrangement, communication and
navigation system (Interferry, 2014).
To enhance maritime safety and marine environment protection, many counter-measures have
been derived from marine disasters. Investigations into marine disasters have led to major
international conventions as illustrated in the table below.

Table 2-2: Regulations derived from very serious casualties
Year

Ships name

Organ

Measures

1912

Titanic

UN, IMO

SOLAS 1929

1965

SS Yarmouth Castle

IMO

SOLAS – Fire and safety amendments (noncombustible material)

1967

Torrey Canyon

IMO

Intervention Convention 1969
MARPOL1973, CLC, 1969

1976

Argo Merchant

IMO

MARPOL 1973 – Protocol of 1978

1977

Tanker Accidents

IMO

SOLAS 1974 – Protocol of 1978

1978

Amoco Cadiz

IMO

SOLAS 1974 – Protocol of 1978 (Introduction of the
remote steering gear)

1982

European Gateway

IMO

SOLAS 1988 – SOLAS 90 stability standards

1987

Herald

IMO

ISM CODE 1994, SOLAS 1988 amendments,

of

Free

SOLAS 1988 – SOLAS 90 stability standards

Enterprises
1988

Scandinavian Star

1990s*

Bulker accidents

1989

Exxon Valdez

IMO

SOLAS 1989 amendments (fire protection)
SOLAS Chapter XII, adopted 1997

IMO

OPRC 1990, MARPOL 1992 amendments (Double
hull)

1994

Estonia

USA

OPA 1990

IMO

SOLAS 1995 amendments
SAR Convention 1998 amendments

1999

Erika

IMO

Follow up in MSC and MEPC

EU

“Erika” Package

2002

Prestige

EU

EUR – OPA

2012

Costa Concordia

IMO

SOLAS Chapter III – Passenger muster requirement

Source: Author, Li (2006) as adopted.
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Typical passenger ships that engage in international voyages must fully comply with the
international regulations like SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW and UNCLOS just to mention. This is
limited to domestic passenger ferries because they operate as coastal and inter-island vessels,
hence are regulated by the State but it does not prevent the owners and operators from applying
the national regulations. States are urged to review and update their national regulations in
relation to passenger vessels and enforce them to encourage the prevention of loss of life,
property and environment damage from ferry related casualties and incidents (IMO, 2015).
2.6

The Legal and Regulatory framework in Kenya

For a competent administration to conduct marine casualty and incident investigations in a
compulsory and legal way, there is a need for regulatory and legal framework to be put in place
to facilitate the same. Further, there is a need to separate maritime casualty investigation from all
the other administrative duties and create an independent body to specifically conduct
investigations. The legal framework in Kenya consists of both national legislation and international
instruments. The Marine casualty investigation currently as stipulated in the KMA Act, shall be
conducted by KMA. This means that the same institution that does the inspections and surveys,
ends up conducting the casualty investigations.
The IMO in its Resolution A.884 (21) imposes a duty on flag States to conduct marine casualty
investigations. Domestic ferries do not fall under the category referred to in this resolution. A State
is therefore supposed to have a national legal framework that may also be similar to the IMO
requirements regarding its domestic fleet. Most developing nations are still struggling to do this,
and Kenya has taken a step further by adopting the code and enforcing it through the Kenya
Maritime Authority as per the provisions in the Merchant Shipping Act, 2009. However, the
regulations are yet to be developed on how to conduct casualty investigations on the domestic
fleet.
Accordingly, the Kenya Merchant Shipping Act (2012) stipulates that when a casualty occurs, the
loss of vessel, life or any damage caused by a vessel a preliminary inquiry into the cause of the
casualty shall be conducted by an appointed person with powers as those conferred on an
inspector by section 411. Further, a formal investigation shall be held by a board specifically
appointed for that inquiry as appointed by the minister and such persons appointed to carry the
assessment shall have requisite skills and knowledge in maritime matters.
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2.7

Statistical Representation of Ferry Accidents in Kenya

Different sources were able to help in achieving statistics on ferry accidents. KMA was one main
source of acquiring the statistics considering its role in surveying, certification, registration,
training and inspection. Also, other reports were acquired from the KFS and KPA safety sections.
All the reports were consolidated as shown in Appendix I.
Ferry transport can be threatened by many unforeseen events that include and not limited to
grounding, technical failure or collisions (Łozowicka & Kaup, 2015). Common to the ferries in
Kenya is technical failure, followed by groundings and rough weather. Least likely to be included
are, sinking and flooding although they are the most catastrophic in their consequences.
According to the reports filed, the main cause of accidents in ferries is mechanical failure followed
by overloading then rough weather. Most accidents have occurred during rough weather between
the months of April to September and are mostly contributed to by the poor stability of the vessel.

Fire
Allision/Contact 1%
5%
Man Overboard
2%

Other
6%
Mechanical Failure
24%

Collision
8%

Grounding
14%

Sinking
19%

Capsizing
21%

Figure 2-5: Graph showing causes of ferry accidents in Kenya for the period 2006-2016.
Source: Author
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3 Methodology
The investigation of everyday accidents and safety related incidents in order to ensure appropriate
passenger safety assessment is very important. Water transport being as important to the nation’s
economy, passenger ferry safety remains vital and should be efficiently and effectively executed.
In fact, several studies have recommended efficiency in accident investigations and mitigation
analysis. However, the high rate of accidents and fatalities is expected due to the high
dependence on passenger ferries in Kenya. This fact is linked by various factors like; purchasing
of old, substandard, and/or inappropriate vessels, congestion, insufficient preparation, and abrupt
perilous weather changes. Any serious attempt to decrease the number and fatality count of ferry
accidents in the developing world must have a complete record of past incidents on which to draw
lessons from (Abigail et Al, 2016). In fact, several studies have recommended efficiency in
accidents and mitigation analysis.
According to Schröder (2004), if all the day-to-day accident-related data were to be analyzed
rather than waiting for an accident to happen, the passenger ferry industry would benefit more,
and the operations of safety would be more enhanced. Passenger ferry accident analysis,
especially causation, is highly complex and must be understood adequately to improve accident
prevention.
It is necessary to assess accidents, their causes and ways to avoid them. In a proactive sense,
situational awareness of accident occurrence is beneficial so as to identify the causes and failures
associated with them in order to take a timely action. (Heinrich et al, 1980). Reason (1990),
introduced the multi-causality of accidents in 1990, whereby according to him, the accident
causation mechanism is a reciprocation of active and latent failures. For this reciprocation to be
avoided, it is essential for top management to be proactively involved. Failures may be readily
noticeable or vice versa. The immediate causes that are observable and quickly distinguished in
an accident are the active failures. Contrary, latent failures can exist in the system for quite a long
period of time before the active failures can reveal them. Hidden within the organization they are
difficult to detect, and examples include poor design, supervision gaps and lack of training.
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(Katsakiori et al., 2009). Those quickly noticed can be dealt with sooner than later, whereas the
rest can take time and cause more damage.
3.1

Assessment of sources and model

Information in the data set of this research is drawn from the accident investigation reports as
provided by the KFS, KPA, and KMA. In addition, where official data was not available, wellrepresented news sources around the world, were considered. Although most of the reports were
available, there were some necessary elements still missing in the entries of some reports. This
is a perfect illustration of how incomplete reporting is done not only on passenger vessel
accidents, but also other accidents. According to Hannah (2016), this mirrors the incomplete
reporting of ferry accidents, complex and multilayered accident causes and lack of careful
accident investigation considering that an independent accident investigation body was missing.
Furthermore, the missing entries and lack of proper accounts regarding passenger vessel
accidents can be considered as the poor record keeping of accident reports. This truncated quality
of accident investigation may be indicative of lessons not learnt from previous accidents.
All accidents obtained as data from the above named three organizations were recorded as
shown in appendix I, they included those that resulted in no casualties, deaths of one or more
passengers and/or crewmembers and those that resulted to no deaths but other impacts were
recorded. Each accident entry includes; date, name of vessel(s) involved, flag, location of the
accident, where available: number of fatalities compared to total passenger involved, the
proximate cause, and any exacerbating factors. Other factors that were available on the reports
but not included in the appendix include their operators or owners; weather conditions; captain
and crew member response; and the timing and effectiveness of search and rescue efforts, if any
was carried out. However, latter factors were inadvertently considered in the selected accident
cases whose reports are used for analysis.
In many developing countries for example Kenya, where ferries are a major transport means for
many, minor passenger ferry accidents are common as well as major delays and major accidents
once in a while. In this case either accident investigations are not carried out or their results are
never published. If we get the full-length detailed investigation reports for all, or even most, of the
cases described in this dissertation, the analysis of passenger ferry accidents, as illustrated
below, would be valuable. With comprehensive reports, we would easily thoroughly outline the
interacting technical, organizational, and human factors leading to fatal passenger ferry accidents
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through various models such as SEMOMAP, as put in practice by Nurwahyudy (2014) to
determine the causes and contributing factors of selected ferry accidents.
3.2

Marine Casualty Investigation

To continually improve and maintain safety, assessing maritime accident casualties through
investigation is an important requirement as stipulated by several IMO conventions. Maritime
casualty investigation is a requirement of SOLAS regulation 1/21, MARPOL Article 8 and
UNCLOS Article 94. Furthermore, IMO has adopted reasons (1990) and Rasmussen’s Taxonomy
of Error (1987) which are part of the HFACS, SHEL and GEMS frameworks to form an integrated
human factor framework for use in the investigation of human factors (IMO 2000). This is an
indication of the big role that maritime casualty investigation plays for improved and safer water
transport.
According to UNCLOS, article 94 on duties of the flag state, paragraph 7, it is the flag states
mandate and duty to conduct maritime casualty investigation. It states:Each state shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably qualified person or
persons into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas involving a
ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals of another State or
serious damage to ships or installations of another state or to the marine environment.
The flag state and the other state shall co-operate in the conduct of any inquiry held by
that other state into any such marine casualty or incident of navigation (United Nations,
1982).
In addition, IMO under SOLAS has adopted IMO Resolution MSc. 255 (84) which is a code that
requires every very serious maritime casualty to be investigated. It requires safety investigation
to be conducted into casualty involving death, severe environmental damage or total loss of the
ship. The code is known as the Casualty Investigation Code, whose aim is to apply international
standards and practices that have been recommended for a marine casualty investigation
(Hannah, 2016). This however as explicitly explained above, only affects international sea going
vessels and not domestic vessels. Therefore, a State is required to draft into their national law, a
legislation that will cover an elaborate way of accident investigation and reporting of near misses
equivalent to the international conventions above to guide in the domestic fleet accident
investigations. This will encourage safety practices in the industry for all domestic vessels.
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3.3

Models of accident Causation

Accident investigation is useful in that it helps one to comprehend the entire process, from how
the accident happens to what should be done to prevent it. It should be able to make an
assumption of how the accident happened and if it was possible to be prevented by considering
some measures that can counter the contributing causal factors. Accident investigation has over
the past century evolved with early focus on equipment or hardware failures being superseded
by more scrutiny on an operator’s unsafe acts or human error after which more focus was given
to the organizational system in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Salmon, 2011). Moreover,
accident models and their scope of investigation are often described together. However, this has
changed over time since many accident causation models available often influence the
investigation outcome by overlooking some things, unlike others.
According to Hollnagel (2002), accident analysis implies an accident model. Anyanwu, (2014),
Psarros et al (2010) further says it is a very important process that provides input for advancement
of cost-effective and proactive regulations. An accident model is a representation of conceptual
abstract of the development and occurrence of accident by describing thoughts of why and how
it occurs and envisions the phenomenon (Hollnagel, 2008). Hollnagel further divided accident
models into epidemiological, sequential and systemic and functional giving each a set of
hypothesis on how analysis should be performed with their respective reality viewed and their
limitations and theoretical foundations.
3.3.1

Traditional Approaches

There are basically two models in the traditional approaches and they include the epidemiological
model and the event based model.
3.3.1.1 Event/sequential based model
Heinrich, in 1931, first introduced the Domino Model. It explains that an event occurs in a
chronological way following a chain reaction of occurrences. He explains that multiple events
occurring each after the other lead to an accident. By eliminating one or more of the links in the
chain of events, an accident can be prevented and he further explains that the model is focused
on the failure and malfunction of independent causes. It is a linear model determining causes to
being independent of every event (Nurwahyudy, 2014).
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Figure 3-1: Domino-model theory
Source: Heinrich (1931)
3.3.1.2 Epidemiological Model (Complex Linear System Models)
This model was originally used on the biological spread of disease. In 1949, Gordon
recommended this model to characterize accident by combining initiating events with
environmental factors making the events outcome leading to the accident out of proportion with
the resulting accident. The model identified that latent factors contribute to the occurrence of
accidents. The Swiss Cheese Model is one example of the epidemiological model as Reason
(1997) proposed due to the argumentation that it identified that the safety barrier can prevent
latent failures from causing accidents if they are set in place. According to Hollnagel (2002), the
epidemiological model for analyzing accidents can be described as the outcome of combined
factors that are hardly strong and difficult to specify in depth.
This model avoids bias potential and may lead to an investigation report that describes an
accident event completely but it is deficient in two respects; first, it needs an efficient and
theoretically supported scheme for classification of accidents and secondly it needs guidance
from a theory of accidents (Harvey, 1985).
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3.3.2

Modern Approach/Systemic Models

These are models that adopt non-linear model concepts developed due to known insufficiencies
in the traditional approach. The models view accidents as emanating development rising because
of the complex synergy between active and latent components that could lead to poor
performance thereby causing an accident. According to Nurwahyudy (2014). These models
include STAMP, CREAM and TRACEr. HFACS is also one of the system based approaches to
accident analysis.
3.4

Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS) Framework

This framework for investigating and analyzing human error was a theoretical based mechanism
affiliated to incidents and accidents as research indicated it could be certainly dependable in
identifying the human factor chain of events associated with accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2007). It investigates active failures by operators including how operator decisions influence the
occurrence of accidents in conjunction with the latent conditions in the management level of an
organization (Celik & Cebi, 2009).
Within Reasons’ Swiss Cheese Model, HFACS emerged from the absence of taxonomies of latent
failures and unsafe acts, therefore it was developed and designed to supplement that gap. It is
an independent method of establishing the contribution of human error towards an accident and
is applied in various kinds of incidents like grounding and collision (Łozowicka & Kaup, 2015). It
was initially designed in the United States for the investigation and analysis of operator errors in
naval aviation incidents. Drawing from Reason’s 1990 concept, it described taxonomies for the
failure mode at each of the four levels in the hierarchy (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2007).
Accordingly, Celik & Cebi (2009), reiterated that the HFACS theory motivated accident
investigators to seeking latent factors like technological environment, fatigue and physical
environment among others increasing consistency of its mechanism for accident investigation
practices. It can therefore be said, investigators are able to classify probable causal factors and
errors across the taxonomies provided across the four levels. Reason (1997) proposed the "Swiss
Cheese" accident causation model and emphasized the organizational dimension of major
accidents. Latent conditions and failures are visibly distinguished through the Swiss cheese
model. Errors and violations are seen as the consequences of deeper causes.
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Undoubtedly, these are unsafe acts known as active failures committed by operators of the
system at the “sharp end” that have an immediate and direct impact on the safety of the system.
On the other hand, latent conditions can exist in a system for a very long time without causing
damaging consequences. Reason (1988), compares them to resident pathogenic agents. In fact,
they need to be combined with a local trigger element and active failures to cause an accident.
According to Chauvin et al. (2013), latent conditions arise from the strategic and top-level
decisions made by governments, manufacturers, regulators, designers, and organizational
managers.

Figure 3-2: Reasons Swiss Cheese model
Source: Salmon, P. (2011)
Made up of four tiers or levels with nineteen causal factors, the structure of HFACS is hierarchical.
The four tiers include unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and
organizational influences. In the hierarchy, it is assumed as factors go up by proceeding from
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active to latent conditions starting from unsafe acts to organizational influences with each level
being dependent on the previous one (Springer, 2016). Figure 3.3 below illustrates this.

Figure 3-3: HFACS Hierarchy
Source: Adapted from Shappell et al., (2007)
3.5

Human Factor Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships (HFACSMSS)

For the success of this dissertation, various accident causation models have been observed.
However, the model chosen and used that has met the author’s preferences and requirements is
the HFACS- MSS by considering Ghirxi’s adaptation of Weigmann & Shappell’s HFACS. The
modified HFACS for machinery spaces on ships is illustrated in the table below as adapted by
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Schroder-Hinrichs et al (2011) with an additional fifth level to the HFACS called outside factors
above the organizational influences with an intention of focusing on the influence of safety
regulations in shipping and their enforcement. This model does not intend to change the prior
existing framework but comes with minor modification since the HFACS framework was originally
designed for use in the aviation industry (Hannah, 2016). The primary aim for this addition is to
cater for the effect of safety regulations in shipping and its enforcement. (Schröder-Hinrichs et al.,
2011)
Table 3-1: HFACS-MSS Framework

Source: Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011)
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3.5.1

Unsafe Acts

These are active actions which lead to an unsafe situation or error. Unsafe acts are classified
according to whether they are intentional or unintentional where intentional acts could be mistakes
or violations while unintentional acts present themselves as slips due to attention lapses and
failures as a result of memory failure (Reason, 1997). According to Reason (1990), unsafe acts
should occur in a spatial and temporal proximity of a hazard. Relating to ferry accidents, unsafe
acts relate to operator actions and reaction towards an existing situation on board. In this type of
industry, it is good to identify unsafe acts from the initial step for the benefit of marine casualty
investigation in order to trace back to management level. It’s however worth noting that several
unsafe acts, by different operators can lead to one accident.

Figure 3-4: Categorization of Unsafe acts
Source: Ghirxi (2008)
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3.5.2

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

Shappell and Wiegman (2000) illustrate preconditions for unsafe acts as factors in a calamity if
active or latent preconditions like the condition of the environment, operators, and personnel that
affect the individuals’ practices to result to an unsafe condition or human error. Both
environmental and individual factors are considered with individual factors covering both the
physical condition and interaction of the human and the environment that widely touch on physical
and technological environment factors (Ren, 2009). In the figure below, the precondition factors
are categorized into three groups: crew condition, environmental factors, and personnel factors

Figure 3-5: Categorization of preconditions for unsafe acts
Source: Ghirxi (2008)
3.5.3

Unsafe Supervision

These are factors in a mishap affected directly by practices, conditions or actions resulting from
decisions, methods or policies of the management chain of command from officers at managerial
level over technical or support level resulting in human error or unsafe situation. There are four
groups under unsafe supervision and they include inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate
operations, supervisory violations and failure to correct known problems (Ren, 2009)

32

Figure 3-6: Categorization of unsafe supervision.
Source: Ghirxi (2008)
3.5.4

Organisational Influences

These are factors in a mishap if the communications, omissions, policies or actions of high-level
management affect conditions, supervisory practices or actions of crew directly or indirectly to
result in human error, system failure or an unsafe situation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, Ren
2009). Under this category, four groups including organizational climate, resource management,
organizational process and statutory are mentioned. The new category added by Ghirxi has
international/national standards and flag state implementation as its subcategories.

33

Figure 3-7: Categorization of organizational influence.
Source: Ghirxi (2008)
3.6

Sample selection

All marine casualty reports are supposed to be reported and recorded in the IMO Global
Integrated Information System (GISIS) based on the IMO reporting requirements. This study
however dwelt on domestic passenger vessels in Kenya only. Domestic ferry incidents and
accidents fall under the national jurisdiction, thus their investigation reports were available only
locally. For the review it was necessary to take a representative sample which allowed to a certain
degree, generalized findings. The reports were complimented by the additional cases of Search
and Rescue incidents coordinated at the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(RMRCC Mombasa) in order to ascertain the number of casualties and level of severity. The time
range of the cases chosen was between 1990 and 2016 and the severity consequences of the
cases are highlighted in the next chapter.
For proper identification and classification of the human factors contained in the identified
investigation reports proper apprehension of different factors and their relationship was necessary
since HFACS-MSS taxonomy does not provide a tool to pinpoint the relationship or failed path
(Ren, 2009). Therefore barrier analysis combined with a time-line was chosen to be used as the
description tool. According to Reason 2006, the barrier concept gives model interaction
opportunity and high risk domain complexity. It is also essential to say that the factors to be
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analyzed have been obtained from the investigation reports while avoiding re-investigating the
accidents that would lead to biased judgement (Ghirxi, 2008).
3.7

Data

Many accidents have been documented in the country and data collected dated back from 1982
to 2016 as shown in Appendix I. Within the overview shown in the appendix, coding was not
possible on most of the accidents because of the lack of substantial information on accident
investigation reports or no reports at all. However, 10 accidents were obtained that occurred in
2011 to 2017 for the analysis. One more accident involving MV Mtongwe I that occurred in 1994
was included in the analysis because of its magnitude in the nation having been the worst
maritime accident to this date.
The seriousness of the reports was categorized according to IMO’s MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.1
requirements on revised harmonized reporting procedures. Very serious casualties were
classified as those that involved total loss of vessel, severe damage of the environment and loss
of life. The serious casualties were classified as those that did not qualify as serious but led to
grounding, collision, and vessel damage from bad weather but resulted to the vessel being unfit
to proceed. Lastly the less serious were classified as those that did not qualify as a very serious
or serious casualties but included hazardous incidents or near misses.
In general 11 marine casualty investigation reports regarding ferries in Kenya have been analyzed
as illustrated in the table below: -
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Table 3-2: Summary of uncoded passenger vessel accidents
Selected passenger vessel incidents / accidents in Mombasa – Kenya
NO.

DATE

VESSEL
NAME
Mtongwe 1

AREA

TYPE

SEVERITY

REMARKS

1

29/4/1994

Likoni
Channel
Kilindini
Harbour

Capsize

Very
Serious
Serious

Lamu

Collision

Very
serious

Lamu

Sinking
Grounding

MV. Yusra

Likoni
Channel
Mukowe

Very
serious
Serious

272 died, more
than 70 rescued
Damage
sustained to
both ships
Damage to both
vessels and
lives lost
Lives lost

2

15/9/2011

3

1/1/2012

4

20/6/2017

5

11/11/2015

MV.
Kwale/Sea
Wind
MV.
Safina/Al
Intsam
MV.
Bassaam
MV. Kwale

Stranding

Serious

27/7/2013

MV. Hodari

Kiwayu

Serious

8

9/6/2016

MV. Kilindini

Likoni
Channel

Less
serious

Loss of one
passenger

9

25/1/2013

MV. Likoni

Serious

Loss of lives

10

17/9/2016

MV. Nyayo

11

6/6/2016

MV.
Harambee

Likoni
Channel
Likoni
Channel
Likoni
Channel

Mechanical
problem
Man and
vehicle
overboard
Vehicle
lost control
Engine
failure
Mechanical
problem

Passengers
evacuated
Passengers
injured
No injuries

6

26/9/2011

7

Less
serious
Less
serious

Passengers
evacuated
Persons injured

Contact

Source: Author
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4 Presentation of the findings from accident reports analyses
The essential aim of this study is to present the passenger ferry accident investigation reports
and data. This chapter presents data as reviewed and coded using the HFACS-MSS by the
author, (See Appendix II). The coding has been further reviewed by a qualified person in
passenger vessel accident investigation to validate or identify any deviations in the analysis. A
total of 11 accidents are analysed. It is important to note that only causal factors that were
explicitly mentioned in the reports have been considered and classified according to the HFACSMSS to avoid subjective interpretations (Chauvin, et al. 2013, Hannah, 2016). With this, no
contributing factors have been added.
The choice of HFACS -MSS was attributed due to the IMO’s adoption of Reason’s (1990) HFACS
model and its guidelines on accident investigations (IMO, 1997, Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011).
According to Li et al. (2008) the model is encouraged for the utilization in the maritime domain.
Therefore, being a widely used framework, the author is motivated to apply it since it can easily
be used for the kind of data available for this research. Machinery Space Systems as adopted by
Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011 does not tamper with the original HFACS framework but it includes
a 5th level called statutory in order to capture the enforcement and influence of safety regulations
in the shipping industry (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011)
For better comprehension, their severity was summarized as shown in table 4.1 below in various
seriousness categories according to IMO’s proposed process of casualty reports analysis and
also the causal factors coded after analyzing the sampled data of ferry accidents around the
Mombasa region, Kenya.
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Table 4-1: Severity of the passenger ferry accidents and coded factors
Accident Category

Number

Coded causal factors from 11 reports

Number

Less serious accident

3

Unsafe acts

12

Serious

5

Preconditions for unsafe acts

16

Very serious accident

3

Unsafe Supervision

5

Organizational influence & Statutory

16

Total

49

Total

11

Source: Author
The level of the undertaken analysis was not affected by how severe the ferry accident was or
the casualty during the accident investigation.
4.1

Utilization of HFACS-MSS Framework and Taxonomy for Accident Analysis

The human factors captured from the presented reports were coded against Ghirxi’s adaptation
of Weigmann & Shappell’s HFACS framework and taxonomy. From the reports outcome, it can
be clearly noted that uncommon accidents do not occur from unique sources but rather a
combination of familiar components as a result of unforeseen hazards and unpredictable
conditions. Human factors identified from one incident are not likely to vary much from those in a
different mishap of the same nature. According to Shappell & Wiegmann (2000), most mishap are
due to similar causes and this was proved to be true during the analysis and coding of the reports.
The aim of Ghirxi in the adaptation of the HFACS framework was to create a platform for future
research and since their adaptation is skewed towards machinery space on ships to capture
safety regulations in the ship industry, it can be trusted to be utilized in this analysis.
Upon Coding the 11 accident reports (see appendix II), as presented in table 4-1 above, causal
factors on Human Factor Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships were
identified. On completing the analyzing and describing of all the accidents the realized human
factors were manually coded using the 3rd Tier HFACS-MSS framework indicated in table 4-2
below.
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Table 4-2: The identified 49 3rd tier HFACS-MSS causal factors in reviewed accident reports.
Figures

Reported HFACS Causal Factors
Statutory
FS xxx
Statutory
FS 000
International standards
FS 100
Flag state implementation
Organizational Influences
OR xxx
Resource management
OR 000 Human resources
OR 100 Technological Resources
OR 200 Equipment/facility resources
OC xxx
Organizational climate
OC 000 Structure
OC 100 Policies
OC 200 Culture
OP xxx
Organizational Process
OP 000 Operations
OP 100 Procedures
OP 200 Oversight
Unsafe supervision/work place factors
SI xxx
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore supervision
SP xxx
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF xxx
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related shortcomings
SV xxx
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
PE xxx
Environmental factors
PE 000
Physical environment
PE 100
Technological environment
PC xxx
Crew Condition
PC 000 Cognitive factors
PC 100 Physiological state
PP xxx
Personnel factors
PP 000
Crew interaction
Pp 100
Personnel readiness
Unsafe acts
AE xxx
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decision and judgement errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV xxx
Violations

No.
6
6
2
4
10
1
0
1
0
8
0
0
8
1
0
0
1
5
3
3
0
0
0
0
2
2
16
12
5
7
1
1
0
3
0
3
12
7
1
5
1
5

%
12.25%
12.25%
4.08%
8.16%
20.41%
2.04%
0.00%
2.04%
0.00%
16.33%
0.00%
0.00%
16.33%
2.04%
0.00%
0.00%
2.04%
10.20%
6.12%
6.12%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
4.08%
4.08%
32.65%
24.49%
10.20%
14.26%
2.04%
2.04%
0.00%
6.12%
0.00%
6.12%
24.49%
14.26%
2.04%
10.20%
2.04%
10.20%
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AV 000
AV 100

Routine violations
Exceptional violations

Total

4
1
49

8.16%
2.04%
100%

Source: Author as adopted from Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011.
A total of 49 causal factors deduced from the analysis of 11 ferry accidents are shown in table 42 above. A clear relation between these factors could not be easily established. Some reports
contained more elaborate investigation discussions than others even though they were of a less
serious accident magnitude than the very serious accidents. As tabulated in the table above, the
data shows that there was no even distribution of all the 3rd tier factors.
The sources of the reports played a significant role as well as how deep the investigation was
carried out and the cause of accident analysis in the reports. The most elaborate were the reports
from the maritime administrator while those chosen from newspapers were not very elaborate
because of the non-follow up of the accidents, and the reporting persons did not have the
adequate technical skills to investigate the accidents but highlighted most of the causal factors as
much as necessary.
According to IMO requirements, the very serious investigation reports are supposed to be
submitted to its secretariat and recorded into the GISIS system while the serious and less serious
reports are not a requirement for submission. No report from the state was found in the IMO GISIS
database.
4.2

Identification of Contributing Factors.

The reports reviewed led into the 49 3rd tier causal factors as shown in Table 4-2 above. Among
the contributing causal factors established, preconditions of unsafe acts were leading with one
third of all the factors followed by unsafe acts with a quarter of all the factors, organizational
influence (20 %), statutory (12%) and the least causal factors identified were unsafe supervision
with 10% in the 1st tier as indicated in Figure 4-1 below.
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Statutory
12%

Unsafe acts
25%

Organizational
influence
20%

Unsafe Supervision
10%

Preconditions for
unsafe acts
33%

Unsafe acts

Preconditions for unsafe acts

Organizational influence

Statutory

Unsafe Supervision

Figure 4-1: Overview of 1st Tier factors
Source: Author

4.2.1

Unsafe acts

There were 12 identified unsafe acts 3rd tier factors from the total causal factors realised. This
represented 24.49% of all the identified factors, slightly about one quarter of all the factors as
illustrated by figure 4-1. Decision and judgement errors represented 41.67% of all the unsafe acts
and were followed by routine violations which was exactly one third of all the unsafe acts identified.
Skill-based errors, perpetual errors and exceptional violations together contributed by 25%
towards unsafe acts with an equal number of one factor each. The review also revealed that at
least all 3rd tier factors of unsafe acts could be identified from most of the reports but were not
evenly distributed among the errors and violations.
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Exceptional Skill-based
errors
violations
8%
8%

Routine violations
34%

Decision and
judgement errors
42%

Perceptual errors
8%

Skill-based errors

Decision and judgement errors

Routine violations

Exceptional violations

Perceptual errors

Figure 4-2: Overview of unsafe acts
Source: Author
4.2.2

Preconditions of unsafe acts

Preconditions of unsafe acts led with 16 factors having a representation of one third (32.65%) of
the total causal factors identified. These were distributed unevenly whereby environmental factors
had two thirds of all the preconditions and were dominated by the technological environment
which had the highest number of factors (43.75%) while the physical environment had 31.25% of
all the preconditions causal factors as represented in figure 4-3 below. Crew interaction and
physiological state in the 3rd tier did not have any factors but all the 2nd tier factors had at least
some factors. Not many causal factors were as a result of crew condition and it represented 6%
of the preconditions identified under cognitive factors in the 3rd tier. The preconditions identified
provided specific indication for deliberating machinery space and engine control room and how it
affects human action leading to unsafe situation. This data can tell the maritime administrators
and the ferry operators the extent to which technological environment factors matter in the dayto-day ferry operations and also to training institutions on what to improve in maritime education
and training.
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Personnel
readiness
19%

Physical environment
31%

Cognitive factors
6%

Technological
environment
44%

Physical environment

Technological environment

Cognitive factors

Personnel readiness

Figure 4-3: Overview of preconditions of unsafe acts.
Source: Author
4.2.3

Unsafe Supervision

This category was the most underrepresented as it was not easy to point out causal factors related
to unsafe supervision from the reports. Out of the total number of identified factors, 10% were
contributed by unsafe supervision. This was contributed to by shipborne and shore supervision
where in a mishap the ships managers’ interaction with those officers at management level
affected the everyday operation on board the ferry. This were the highest number of contributing
human factors in the unsafe supervision category with 60% of all unsafe supervision factors while
the remaining percentage was due to shipborne violations. Shipborne operations and shipborne
related shortcomings did not contribute to any of the accidents.
4.2.4

Organizational influences and Outside factors

Ten organizational influence factors were identified in seven accident reports representing 20%
of the total causal factors while 6 outside factors were identified in six reports. 80% the
organizational factors, were due to culture while the remaining attributed to oversight and
technological resources with each having 10%. Culture was the leading 3rd tier causal factor
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whereby it contributed by 16.33% of all the causal factors. This is as a result of how a company’s
custom, crew attitude and values in the work environment affect their day-to-day decisions and
contribute to unsafe acts. In most of the reports, this is attributed to pressure from passengers
especially those using the ferries plying the Likoni channel. The ferry schedules according to the
ferry operators as indicated in the reports, if not handled well lead to stampedes and overloading
rendering the ferries in to further unsafe condition.
Outside factors arise in mishaps if the regulator lacks the necessary depth or leads a sub-standard
regime. National standards factors were identified in 2 accident reports representing one third of
statutory factors reflecting the drawbacks that could be in national regulations and policy
enforcement. The remaining two thirds was identified in port state and flag state implementation.
Outside factors contributed by 12.25% of the total identified causal factors because in domestic
ferries there is no international control as the conventions do not affect them but rather the national
policies and regulations.
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5 Discussion of the accident review findings
The results presented in the preceding chapter has been discussed with regards to the 11
accidents analysed in this dissertation. Some of the reports were detailed while some explicitly
lacked detail making it impossible to identify more causal factors. However, that by itself can also
be considered as an important data source to understand how ferry accidents are handled in
Kenya, the record keeping and the kind of investigation carried on. According to SchröderHinrichs et al (2011), a look into other studies from the same domain have indicated present
consistent causal factor structures. In comparison, by this study focusing on domestic passenger
ferries in Kenya, it could relate to the other studies findings and it was thus easier to identify active
failures more easily than latent failures, as was discovered in most reports. Human factors
contributing directly to the cause of the accident, like collision and overloading, are discussed and
also other parameters with broad factors including, but not limited to vessel non-maintenance,
sailing in bad weather, failure to provide life-saving appliances among others.
5.1

The unsafe acts involving crew and ferry operators

Crew and ferry owners or operators attributed to many unsafe acts as a result of errors of
commission like performing incorrect acts, errors of omission whereby an act is left out like the
maintenance of ferries MV Harambee and MV Kilindini. Also, timing whereby ferries were sailing
in very rough seas an example of MV Nyayo and Bassaam, without considering their stability.
Errors of sequence like, overloading the MV Nyayo, not maintaining it and further letting it sail in
very rough seas. If a system is more complex there are likely to be multiple unsafe acts due to
errors of sequence or if acts are performed in the wrong order. For instance, the Likoni channel
due to the area in which the ferries operate, serves as the approach to Kilindini harbour which
has vessels entering and leaving the port. Therefore, considering the high number of passengers
and vehicles that need to use ferries across the channel without delays, increases the complexity
of the ferry operations. This was observed during the review of the reports when some latent
conditions led to active failures whenever there was a small breakdown in one of the ferries or if
there was any delay. Errors have different psychological sources, take different forms and happen
at various sections of the system requiring diverse ways of solving them. So as to be able to know
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who is at the sharp end of the accident, prior understanding of each step and section of the system
by the investigator is necessary. According to Hollnagel (2008), the function of the system is more
important than the structure in order to reduce the number of mishaps.
If the investigation reports were to be utilized properly, the kind of multiple errors of same nature
could not be seen recurring in different incidents. To start with, the 1994 Mtongwe I accident could
have been used as a learning platform in avoiding the causal factors that led to the accident. The
vessel was being overloaded on a routine basis until the accident day. Similar to what was
reported in the report of sinking of Mtongwe I, a big percentage of ferries operating in Mombasa
are always overloaded especially during the rush hours as discussed in the literature review. Out
of the 11 accidents analysed, 8 of them have serious cases of overloading beyond the vessels
capacity.
Most unsafe factors account to Errors AE 200 – decision and judgement errors. An example is
where MV Mtongwe I’s coxswain decided to sail with the vessel even though he noticed that it
was overloaded, but due to the fact that he had done several voyages before with the vessel in
similar condition, he did not think of any other underlying latent factor that could lead to the failure
of the vessel and its further capsizing. Almost 20 years later, this is seen being repeated by MV
Nyayo, Harambee, Kwale, Bassaam and many other ferries. Other errors include skill-based
errors as seen during the contact between MV. Kwale and Sea Wind. Perceptual errors were also
noted in the case of MV. Bassaam whose operator or crew lacked situational awareness on
weather condition before voyage.
Violations, more so routine violations, were identified for example in the Mtongwe I accident,
which frequently overloaded the vessel especially during rush hours and also on the collision
between Safina and Al-intsam, where Safina was overloaded and both vessels were operating at
night without navigational lights. The captain of Bassaam who had 30 years’ experience, but did
not have any formal professional qualifications, was also classified as a routine violation.
5.2

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

Most factors were identified in this category and environmental factors were the major contributing
in most of the accidents because of machinery space, engine control room and technical
procedures and how they affected crew performance leading to unsafe situations. Technological
environment led among the other factors, especially the vessels operating at the Likoni channel
due to vessel maintenance issues and machinery failure, for instance MV Nyayo and MV
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Harambee. The lack of navigational lights on Safina and Al-Intsam and MV Hodari operating with
a malfunctioning engine was considered technological factors. On its own, technological
environment contributed by 14.26% of all the 49 causal factors identified and was the second
highest of the contributing factors. Physical environment was the second cause of many mishaps
under environmental factors due to the effects of nature like bad weather and rough seas where
for example, in the case of MV Kwale contact with the Sea Wind, the Coxswain of Kwale had not
taken into consideration the currents and rising tides. The same was experienced with Bassaam
and MV Nyayo. Operating during the night limited the physical environment of Safina and AlIntsam leading to an unsafe situation.
5.3

Unsafe Supervision

Most of the causal factors falling under this category were identified from the Mtongwe I sinking,
Kwale and Sea wind contact, MV Nyayo and MV Harambee accidents. In the case of Mtongwe I,
shipborne violations were identified because the ferry was overloaded on a regular basis and the
management failed to correct the action. For MV Harambee, the management knew the vessel
was unfit but due to the fact that two other vessels were undergoing repair, the vessel was allowed
to operate. During the Sea wind and Kwale contact, the VTS was not monitoring vessel activities
in the busy channel and could have alerted MV. Kwale on time before the contact. Twenty years
after the sinking of Mtongwe I ferry, most ferries that operate the Likoni channel still operate under
similar circumstances as depicted in the reports.
5.4

Organizational Influences and Outside Factors

The study revealed quite a number of organizational and outside factors. This indicated how the
actions and policies of upper level management affect the crew actions leading to unsafe
situations. On organisational influence, organisational climate contributed highly through culture
on board. This was seen in several mishaps where for example overloading was done and in
other cases is still done regularly but the management has failed to correct this known culture
instead leaving it to lead to an unsafe situation. The lack of safety culture is seen in a number of
vessels including Mtongwe I, Safina and Al-intsam, Bassaam whereby the captain did not have
formal training, Hodari, MV Kilindini, MV Nyayo for allowing an unseaworthy vessel to fill in for
other ferries and on MV Harambee which, although faulty, was allowed to operate for economic
reasons.
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Other organisational influences were due to oversight causal factors in the case of Nyayo where
two other vessels were already out of order and another was technological resources in the case
of MV Harambee that was allowed to operate while faulty because there were no funds to repair
the defective vessel.
Under HFACS-MSS, outside factors form their own category and for this study it was used to
evaluate the performance of flag and port state control on domestic fleet. In most cases, there are
no measures in place to prevent faulty ferries from operating and there is no evidence of regular
inspections as identified on the vessel Hodari. The national standards too are compromised and
in cases like Safina the police did not have sufficient powers to stop the overloaded vessel from
sailing. The causal factor most identified is port and flag state implementation whereby the state’s
inspections fail to help capture the vessels deficiencies in advance to prevent unsafe situations.
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to analyse the factors caused by human error in the domestic ferries in
Kenya with an aim of finding a solution on how to reduce the named factors. The study therefore
further looked into marine casualty investigations and the status of investigations after ferries
have had mishaps that led to casualties.
According to IMO, up to 80% of accidents are caused by human error, however safety of domestic
ferries in Kenya depend on a variety of factors not limited to human factors, such as bad weather,
navigational, technical, operational and statutory factors. This analysis has found that many types
of accidents in the country are caused by human factors. From Appendix 1 it is clear that there
have been so many accidents occurring within a short range of time, especially from the most
recent years. This is a period whereby it is expected that accidents are supposed to have reduced
because the maritime administration has ratified policies and regulations to improve safety,
allowed better and more stable vessels to operate, and learnt lessons from previous accidents.
With the introduction of maritime education and training in local universities and colleges, it is also
expected that the level of training among crews is now improved.
Recurring accidents prompt one to question if the policies and regulations enforced by the
maritime administrator were being adhered to. With the right regulations, technical standards, and
right resources the chance of bringing down accidents due to human error are very high if the
right people with the correct knowledge and skills run the ferry industry. Ship owners are also not
left out since some factors pointed out from the reports indicate that they have contributed to
some of the causes of the accidents.
During the data collection, it was very difficult to sample reports due to quality of the report
reflected either by incomplete accident reporting, lack of reliable accident investigations and in
other cases complex forms of accidents or multilayered accidents. There was a very big indication
of poor record keeping as well as poor accident investigation reports which for the few available
were never published and here this is proposed as another human factor that is contributing to
the lack of safety with the domestic ferries in Kenya. However, this should not be seen as a failure
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of the research project but as another learning point for the ferry sector in Kenya since it reflects
the exact picture of the unexplored marine casualty investigation and gives a leeway for further
studies in the same in order to improve in the future.
One challenge contributed by the quality of reports was the difficulty in recognizing human error,
especially in reports by non-technical personnel and more so in cases where newspaper reports
were used. Media personnel are non-technical and may not always have access to the accident
scene. To address the issue of quality of the media reports, an analysis had to be done to
determine only those accidents with a high percentage of fatalities attributable to human error. In
this case human error only included those errors leading directly to the accident. Overloading,
collision, sailing in inclement weather after misjudgment, vessel maintenance are all examples of
errors that were considered as factors. Due to the insufficiency of the casualty investigations
reviewed, not all factors were included but for the reason of not trying to reinvestigate the
accidents, only those factors explicitly mentioned in the reports were used for the analysis.
Utilization of the HFACS framework and taxonomy in accident analysis involving domestic
passenger ferries in Kenya was successful and the association between the reviewed accident
investigation reports and the theoretical model was collaborative even though with limitations from
some reports were not being sufficiently investigated. Human factors associated with the ferry
owners gave a meaningful trend indicating that they played a role in both latent and active failures
during accidents. Therefore, it is paramount for the ferry owners to underpin the causes of
previous accidents and the reasons why the regulations in force have not enabled them to achieve
maximum safety in the operation of the ferries.
As a result of the lack of an independent accident investigation body in Kenya at the moment, the
quality of marine casualty investigation is poor compared to the investigation reports of similar
accidents that have been uploaded in the IMO GISIS platform from other nations. The same can
also be said on the record keeping of the investigated cases. Incidents involving marine casualty
investigation need to be properly documented and this can only be achieved with a proper
understanding of the importance of IMO’s objective and the role of accident investigation. To
achieve these objectives independence is key, not forgetting the incorporating of near misses as
part of the investigation.
With maritime education and training now being offered in the country, marine casualty
investigation should be considered as an area of interest and be offered as a course locally.
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Overall, the marine casualty investigation’s main aim is to contribute towards improving maritime
safety and preventing similar incidents in future. Investigation reports are supposed to be centrally
kept and the more serious cases forwarded to the IMO Secretariat and uploaded in the GISIS
system for further reference and learning. The Likoni and Lamu channels should be considered
as a hot spot for ferry accidents considering the busy ferry traffic operations thereto.

51

7 Recommendations
It is not easy for an investigator to get all the facts together that contribute to an accident. The
nature of a human being during an accident investigation tends to be protective and therefore
what a person reveals about the casualty is limited. In most cases, the major cause of an accident
is masked and necessary the evidence destroyed. Commercial vessel owners may also reveal
less information to protect their interests and in most cases hide behind classification society
certificates and some may never even report a casualty. This has seen non genuine links created
between vessel owners and other stakeholders like the administrator, the insurance and the users
because they see accident reporting as a reflection of their weaknesses. The crew also does not
want to take the responsibility for the accidents for fear of being fired or replaced and therefore
not reporting is the easiest way to avoid blame.
Flag states are also seeing accident investigations as an undesired expense and a bad reflection
of their image. As a matter of fact, looking from both sides, there are a lot of contradictions that
need to be approached carefully in the safety chain and managed properly to achieve maritime
safety through proper maritime casualty investigation. Starting with ship design, construction,
inspection, maritime administration, maritime education and training institutions, lending
institutions, owners, crew, survivors all the way to insurance and P & I clubs, the list, though not
exhaustive, indicates quite a number of parties that may be part of a marine casualty investigation.
It also shows how complex marine accident investigations can become. From the analysis in this
study, the author has suggested the following recommendations to reduce mishaps caused by
human errors in the ferry industry in Kenya.
Establishing an Independent investigation body
The public uses the ferries often and has entrusted the maritime administration with their safety.
Therefore, in order to have transparency and to avoid conflict of interest, accident investigation in
Kenya must be totally separated from the responsible administrative organization that regulates
and enforces policies as proposed in IMO’s Res. A.884 (21) that was adopted in May, 2008.
Legislation should be promulgated and developed in respect to accident investigation to yield
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credible reports for the regulators, operators and the public. A team of experts should also be
established with proper academic qualifications and experience to carry out the duties as required
during investigations. The investigation body should be formed with the aim not to blame or fault
but to identify the causes of marine casualty and make recommendations to avoid similar
accidents and incidents in the future so as to improve water transport (MCIB, 2017).
A legislation to ensure that investigators have access rights to accident scenes and materials like
VDR’s without intervention should also be put in place. Guidelines should be adopted from the
IMO casualty investigation and local guidelines should be developed for the owners/operators of
passenger ferries and their crew with respect to investigation.
Creation of a central database and a confidential casualty reporting system
A good example of such a system is the European Maritime Casualty Information Platform
(EMCIP) which is a data distribution system and database intended for broadening the analysis
of causality information, and providing ready information for the use to enable in identifying risk
and documenting casualties. Simply for all those party to the ferry industry in Kenya to contribute
towards the reduction of ferry accidents in Kenya, and to reduce the fatality rate involving ferry
casualties, there must be a complete record of past incidents to draw lessons, just like the IMO,
EMSA Worldwide Ferry Safety Association (WFSA) and the Interferry pledge. To ensure that no
incident or accident goes unreported, a confidential casualty reporting system is encouraged with
the aim that the reporting person’s identity shall not be disclosed but the reported cases will be
fully investigated.
A mailing list should also be established in order to ensure all relevant stakeholders receive the
accident investigation reports. The database should also serve as reference material during future
investigations and the reports should be protected from being amended or deleting some parts.
Audit of the existing passenger ferries
A thorough inspection of the current domestic passenger vessels against the required standards
and according to the national regulations as stipulated in the merchant shipping act as this can
eliminate unsafe acts of violations based on risk assessment, failing to comply with manuals,
operating when unauthorised and violating standing orders and regulations. Audits can also prune
out unqualified crews leading to ferries that are equipped with competent crew that can ensure
that they are run in a safer manner. Also, if the owners and operators of the ferries could work
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hand-in-hand with the maritime administrator, take caution and follow the rules and regulations
developed for their safety rather than focus too much on making profits, they can improve safety.
Training
Training based on the team approach targeting the reduction of human error related accidents is
necessary. This can be achieved through targeting various categories of stakeholders that include
the administrative staff, the ferry owners and operators, the crew and the passengers or public in
general. A more intensive and incentive based training is recommended for all captains and crew
of the ferries in the country that involves low cost technologies and more intuitive items to help
them learn the latest trends in the ferry industry and how they can use the latest technology in
line with their duties to help reduce accidents. The promotion of such trainings at the Bandari
College in Mombasa is necessary so as to encourage as many persons in the ferry sector to train.
The investigators should also be trained, qualified and must be totally objective and uphold the
utmost integrity during investigation with skills as outlined in resolution A.996 (25) for
investigators. Knowing well that their conclusions and recommendations have far reaching
consequences, they should demonstrate patience and understand relevant circumstances during
the investigation. They should know what standards to apply in various situations and examine
against those standards.
The training institutions should also develop programs using guidelines as laid down in the IMO
short courses so that a degree of uniformity is achieved to a global level. Also ensure that officers
who return to these institutions for revalidation under the STCW convention undergo courses in
accident investigation in the context of accident prevention.
The ship Owner and operators
The accident reporting culture should be the norm. Ship owners must ensure that not only the
ship board managers, but all on board their vessels, are aware of their policy with respect to the
investigation of events and how such a policy fits into the overall policy of ensuring safety at sea
and reducing accidents caused by human error. They should also ensure that the management
team on board their vessels are well prepared to contribute towards accident investigation through
company education.
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Bridge or tunnel for Likoni channel
With the current upsurge of passengers using the Likoni Channel rising above 300,000 people
per day, it is evident that unless the ferry operator secures more ferries, there is always going to
be more stampedes from passenger scrambling for the minimum ferries available. One long term
solution is a bridge or a tunnel from the Island to the Southern coast of Kenya through Likoni. Due
to security reasons and the channel being considered an ISPS area because it serves as the
approach to the port of Mombasa’s Kilindini harbour, a tunnel will be more viable and preferable
than a bridge. This will have an impact on the latent failures which later manifest to active failures
over a long term leading to ferry accidents in that channel.
Weather reporting system
Even though general weather is usually broadcasted by media houses, special marine weather
should be given an up-to-the-minute broadcasting priority specifically to sea-going personnel for
adequate planning. Therefore, a system that is capable of broadcasting daily and hourly and
developing weather updates at sea is necessary so as to enable the operators and seafarers to
prepare adequately. Unsafe weather conditions, strong winds and tides, storms or even tsunamis
and cyclones pose safety danger to all vessels at sea.

An improved affordable weather

information system will help even small business owners in the ferry industry to have situational
awareness and in the long run improve safety and prevent loss of life due to weather related
human factors. It is preferable to have an SMS system that can push messages from a central
source, for example the RMRCC to the seafarers’ mobile phones as a complimentary weather
broadcasting system. Such a system, by example, is the NOAA’s crowdsourcing weather data
app for cell broadcasts alias the Meteorological Phenomena Identification near the Ground
(MPING).
Control of overcrowding and overloading
The ferries offering services especially at the Likoni Channel are absolutely free whereas the rest
are equally very cheap as compared to the other means of transport. This has made transport by
water the cheapest and most preferable among many residents accessing the islands and
mainland. The disadvantage of this has been an increased number of passengers that has led to
overcrowding and overloading of the ferries. Increase in the number of passengers is an
underlying risk and with time combined with one active failure can contribute towards an accident.
The maritime administrator is needed to play a huge role by having more strict regulations and

55

penalties to the operators against overloading the ferries. Nowadays, there are technologies to
count passengers as they pass through to board the vessel such that once the limit has been
reached the vessel cannot take extra passengers. There are also weighing systems that are
similar to elevator systems that can tell when the vessel’s maximum tonnage has been attained.
The maritime administrator should ensure these systems are in place and working at all the
boarding ramps or piers.
On the other hand, it is easier to educate the public in general by holding campaigns on the ground
and through media about their own safety and how they can contribute actively to ensure they are
not part of the problem but rather a solution. In 2013 passengers in a Hong Kong vessel prevented
it from departing when they noticed cargo blocking the exits. This was triggered by a lesson from
a previous accident which occurred and where the loss of lives could have been prevented if the
vessels exits were not blocked in the same way (Golden & Weisbrod, 2016). This showed that
passengers in a known danger can actively contribute towards minimizing the risk they are aware
facing them.
Mass Rescue Operations
Disasters will continue to happen globally and regularly but despite this, the multi-agency
approach towards response has remained a poorly researched area (Chen et al. 2008, Salmon
et al. 2011, & Salmon et al. 2014). Considering the vast SAR area that Kenya has, and very
minimal rescue resources, involvement of other organizations with the help of the SAR
coordination by the RMRCC Mombasa will improve the rescue services and minimize the number
of fatalities. Mass rescue operations coupled with cooperation among the several state
organizations and private agencies is necessary in order to ensure faster and more robust rescue
services are availed in case there is a ferry accident
Enforcing the ISM code in national legislation
The MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7 (2008) section 9 of the ISM code promotes the reporting of near misses
as this encourages promotion of a safety culture and also as an integral part of continually
improving safety management systems. This will provide the marine casualty investigators a
chance to be at bay from deducing blame to the sharp end which always points at the crew on
board the vessel but rather gives investigation a holistic approach whereby, the more deep an
investigation is carried out, the more factors will be identified, and if recommendations are
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implemented this can improve the whole system in general. Also, because the ISM code is seen
as the ideal instrument to address organizational factors (IMO, 2010).
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Appendix I
Causality Data List.
DATE

VESSEL'S
NAME

9/5/1982

MV. Eva

18/5/1983

MV. Sanko
Cherry
MV.
Bateleur
MV. Morea

7/10/1983
1/6/1984
19/6/1984
25/3/1987
27/8/1987
9/11/1987
6/7/1988
6/8/1988

VESSE
L'S
FLAG

Kiboko/Alex
a
Raudha
F.T. Jonay
MV. Silago
Express

Kenya/

Yatch
Emirites
MV. Harrier

N/A

Spain

PLACE/REGION

TYPE OF
INCIDENT/ACCIDEN
T
Grounding

NO. OF
DEATHS

Grounding

0

Capsizing

3

Sinking

8

Collision

0

Off coast of Lamu
Off coast of Lamu
Mombasa Port
Approach

Grounding
Man Overboard
Grounding

0
1
0

Mombasa Port

Container Lifting
failure
Capsizing

0

Mombasa Port
Approach
Mombasa Port
Approach
South East Of
Madagascar
Enroute to
Kismayu
Mombasa Port

South Coast

0

Unknown

10/12/1988

MV. Atlantic
Maru

Mombasa Port
Approach

Stranding

0

24/5/1990

MV. Ujuzi

Off Malindi

Grounding

9

8/7/1990

MV.
Bernora
Hana

Mombasa Port
Approach
Off coast of
Malindi
Tanga
Old port
Mombasa
Kilifi

Grounding

0

Capsizing

Unknown

Capsizing
Grounding

10
0

Sinking

0

Off Coast of
Somalia
Kilindini berth #4

Sinking

1

Man Overboard

1

5/1/1991
7/3/1992
3/9/1992
16/8/1993
16/8/1994
25/8/1994

Khairat
Zanzibar
Atiatularah
man
M.V Indian
Somalia
Ocean
MV.
Ramora Bay
M.V. Brats
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29/04/1994

Mtongwe 1

25/03/1995

21/5/1998

Suzanne
Delmas
M.V.
Bonsella
M.V. Niyzao
MT.
Shareen
M.T. Johana
MV.
Nedlloyd
Maine
Jain Hong
201
M.V.Fadhil
Karim
SV. Iqbal

11/1/2002

Hidaya

1/6/2005

Ahlam

22/5/2005
2/7/2005

Likoni Channel

Capsizing

Apx. 270

Mombasa Port

Heavy Contact

0

Tanga

Capsizing

0

Tiwi South coast
Mombasa Port

Capsizing
Heavy Contact

0
0

Mombasa Port

Grounding
Jammed Container

0
0

Off coast of
Mombasa
Old port
Mombasa
TZ/KN Boarder

Sinking

Unknown

Sinking

0

Capsizing

6

N/A

Kisite M. Park

Sinking

0

Kenya

Lamu

Man Overboard

1

MV. Ruaha

Mombasa Port

Man Overboard

1

Mombasa Port

Heavy Contact

0

Mtwapa Creek
SECO repair yard

Capsizing
Man overboard

1
1

Mombasa Port

Stevedores collapsed
in cargo hold
Towing rope accident

0

14/6/2008

De La
Franqueira/
Sanjeeda
Fossil
Barge
Bartun
M.V Asian
Trader
M.T. Rhino

4/7/2008

M.V. Kairos

Fire

Unknown

17/9/2008

Al-Itifaq &
Afuwa
Onega I
B. Spacial
Tusitiri
Elbaron

Collision

1

Sea
Kisumu Port
Mtwapa
L Victoria

Death of crew
Man Overboard
Capsizing
Capsizing

1
1
1
1

L Victoria
L Victoria
L Victoria
Mombasa Port

Capsizing
Capsizing
Capsizing
Collision

2
2
2
0

Rambira beach

Capsizing

3

30/5/1995
16/10/1995
24/01/1996
22/9/1996
21/5/1997

5/7/1997
19/10/1997

5/23/2006
8/10/2007
13/12/2007

4/11/2008
11/12/2008
8/9/2009
02/05/10
06/06/10
06/06/10
06/06/10
12/8/2010
17/8/2010

Kirande
Mzee Adero
Jerusalem
MV.S.
Cunene/ Ibi
O. Janabi

Kenya

Bahama
s
Kenya
Kingston

The
Netherla
nds

N/A
N/A

Off Mombasa
coast
AMGECO Dry
dock
Lamu
Panama
Kenya

1
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19/9/2010

One love

4/10/2010

TCG
Gokceada
Salome
MT FAITH
O. Nyomogi

Turkey

Kenya
Kenya/

26/09/2011

Lulu
MV. Kwale/
Sea Wind
MV Yusra

24/11/2011

Kaya

29/11/2011

MV. Blida/
Kota Nekad

Singapo
re

1/1/2012

Safina/ AlIntisam
Shufaa

Pirates beach

Sinking

0

Likoni Chanel

Grounding

0

L Victoria
MOMBASA
L Victoria

Capsizing
Man overboard
Capsizing

6
1
19

Mtwapa Creek
Mombasa Port

Capsizing
Contact

0
0

Mukowe

Contact

0

Sigir crossing
point
Mombasa Port

Capsizing

17

Heavy Contact

0

Kenya/
Kenya
Kenya

Lamu

Collision

20

Lamu

Capsizing

5

Unknown
Patrickmutu
a
M.V Mara/
Manda
Millenium
MV. Chang
Tai Hong

Kenya
Kenya

Nyandiwa beach
L. Chala

Capsizing
Capsizing

2
4

Kenya

Manda jetty

Collision

0

Kenya
Hong
Kong

Watamu
Mombasa Port

Capsizing
Injury to Personnel

0
1

18/12/2012

Sara Dayo

Kenya

River Nyando

Capsizing

5

21/1/2013

Intl’ Medical
Corps
MV. Likoni

Kenya

Off Mfangano
Island
Likoni Channel

Loss of Stability

0

Barrier failure

11

14/04/2013

Sifa Ya
Bwana

Kenya

L. Turkana –
Turkana county

Drowning

9

24/4/2013

MT.
Ambrosia

Mombasa Port

Pilot Ladder failure Drowning

1

11/07/2013
27/07/2013

Maverick
M.V Hodari

Kenya
Kenya

Diani
Kiwayu

Shipwrecked
Mechanical problem

0
0

06/08/2013
30/10/2013

Ombembe
MV. Zella
Oldendrff

Kenya
Malta

Lake Jipe
Mombasa Port

Capsizing
Heavy Weight
Crushing

1
1

10/01/2014

Kukhu
Nang'oma

Kenya

Sumba Channel
(L. Victoria)

Capsizing

0

01/05/2014

Mkizi

Kenya

Mld Marine Park

Not stated

0

07/10/10
17/10/10
01/11/10
27/08/2011
15/9/2011

22/01/2012
06/02/2012
23/02/2012
09/04/2012
21/08/2012
3/11/2012

25/01/2013
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20/11/2014
2/1/2015
10/1/2015
14/01/2015
19/01/2015
6/4/2015
25/05/2015

Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya

Msa Marine park
Diani
Diani
Lamu
Kisite mpunguti
white sands
Malindi M. Park

Capsizing
Capsizing
Flooding
Mechanical Failure
Grounding
Capsizing
Flooding

4
4
15
0
12
12
0

24/7/2015
22/9/2015
19/10/2015
11/11/2015

KWS boat
Kitezi
Alsamadi
MV. Andrea
MV. Bilaal
Jet Ski-Boat
MV Waamo
Star
MV Alsham
FV Vega
Kahawa
MV. Kwale

Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya

Lamu
Mambrui Malindi
Mombasa
Likoni Channel

Capsizing
Grounding
Drifting
Grounding

5
20
2
0

20/01/2016
28/02/2016

Rangi
Nuzla

Kenya
Kenya

Sinking
Capsizing

4
2

11/3/2016
17/05/2016
6/6/2016

Kenya Navy
Zuhura
MV
Harambee
Al -Ikhlas
MV. Kilindini
Mombasa 1
Likoni 1
Mastakher II
Tamu
Hamza
Bishara
Zabar
Mashallah
Mv. Nyayo

Kenya
Kenya
Kenya

Shimoni
Lamu - Manda
bay
Magogoni
Shimoni
Likoni Channel

Capsizing
Mechanical failure
Ditched

Unknown
5
1

Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya

Mkandani
Likoni Channel
English point
Diani
Pemba channel
Mtwapa
Diani - Tiwi
Lamu
Lamu - Kiunga
Msambweni
Likoni Channel

Capsizing
Man Overboard
Capsizing
Capsizing
Engine Failure
Drowning
Capsizing
Capsizing
Capsizing
Capsizing
Engine Failure

18
1
6
4
5
4
2
4
5
16
0

9/6/2016
09/06/2016
13/06/2016
7/7/2016
26/7/2016
29/7/2016
17/08/2016
24/08/2016
29/08/2016
6/9/2016
17/9/2016
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Appendix II
Coding Human Factor as retrieved from the reports
Only the human factors to be analyzed have been retrieved from the reports that are within the
scope of shipping operators, the crew and the maritime administration. Other factors like the
shipping operator’s unsafe acts and maintenance will be discussed as indicated in the reports.

1. Mtongwe 1
Accident information sheet
Accident no.: 1
Date: 27/04/1994
Accident category: Sinking
Ship involved:

MV Mtongwe I

Length:
Breath:
Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

KFS

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

27/04/1994

Accident time:
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Injuries: 270 lost lives
Casualties: 400
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The Herald)
Summary of the accident: The vessel was designed to carry a maximum of 300 people. On the
fateful day the vessel had 400 onboard from Mtongwe to Mombasa. The ferry as reported, always
carried in excess during the rush hours and had always crossed the channel safely. On the fateful
day it was crammed tight with people. It appeared overloaded and swayed violently. It capsized
and sank about 40 meters away from the mainland. A total number of 272 lives were lost in the
accident.

Unsafe Acts
Violation - Routine violation (AV 400)
To proceed with an overloaded ship.
Pre-conditions
Cognitive factors – Overconfidence (PC 100)
According to the report – the ferry was always overloaded during rush hours
Personnel factors - Personal readiness (PP 200)
Disregard for rules and instructions combined with poor judgement
Unsafe supervision
Supervisory violations – Shipborne Violations (SV 000)
If the ferry was overloaded on a regular basis and the management failed to correct the action on
board, they have acted negligently and enabled the accident to happen.
Organizational influence
Organizational climate – culture (OC 200)
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If the ferry was overloaded on a regular basis and the management failed to correct the action on
board, they have acted negligently and enabled the accident to happen.
Outside factors/Statutory - Flag State (FS – 100)
If there were there any rules, procedures and authorized personnel in place to notice and stop
this development.

2. MV. Kwale/ Sea Wind
Accident information sheet
Accident no.: 2
Date: 15/09/2011
Accident category: Contact
Ship involved:

MV Kwale/Sea wind

Length:

75/119.014

Breath:

16.05M/18.6

Tonnage: 637/6425
Build when: 2010/1988
Build where:
Operator:

KFS

When the ship was taken over by the operator: KFS/Liberia
Accident date:

15/09/2011

Accident time:
Injuries: none
Casualties:
Total loss: No
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Source of information about the accident: KMA
Summary of the accident: The vessel Sea Wind was fast and secure on the wharf from
September 10th waiting to overload. Kwale was underway crossing the channel from mainland
on 15th sept the Ro-Ro Passenger Ferry made contact with the Liberian registered general cargo
ship, MV. Sea Wind at the Mbaraki Wharf, along the Kilindini Harbor Channel where according to
the report she had been secured by port pilots with a 15m overhang towards the ferry landing for
a period of five days. On the 5th day the coxswain had just taken over shift and that was his first
voyage. In the report, the Coxswain said he lost control of the vessel due to steering failure. But
after the contact he continued with normal operation of the vessel. It was established that the
vessel did cause contact as a result of suffering mechanical failure but due to not factoring in the
incoming tide.

Unsafe acts
Errors - Decision and judgment errors (AE 200)
(AE 205) - Failed to pay attention to incoming and rising tide and the effects this causes to the
vessel
(AE 201) - Failed to realize the importance of the use of navigational equipment in this situation
Pre-conditions
Environmental factors – Physical environment (PE 100)
-

Strong flooding and tides

-

Movement of the vessel

Outside factors – Statutory
Port State (FS 000) - No supervision of ship movements in the area

3. MV. Safina/ Al-Intisam
Accident information sheet
Accident no.: 3
Date: 2/1/2012
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Accident category: Collision
Ship involved:

MV Safina/Al-Intsam

Length:
Breath:
Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

Private

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

1/1/2012

Accident time: 0030hrs
Injuries: 20 lives lost
Casualties: 82
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The Telegraph)
Summary of the accident: This is a commuter passenger vessel which collided with another
vessel at night while carrying about 82 passengers on board. 43 passengers were saved while 9
bodies were recovered. The report does not give further account of the missing persons but a
total of 20 persons died. The passenger ferry was intentionally overloaded with people and
baggage and both vessels had no navigational lights. They were operating in the dark when they
collided. According to the report before the boat left a police officer tried to stop it but the operator
talked him out. The report blamed boat operators for not observing safety regulations.

Unsafe acts
Violation – Routine (AV 400)
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No navigation light on
Violation – Routine (AV 400)
Overloading the vessel
Pre-conditions
Environmental factors – Physical Environment (PE 100)
It was night time
Environmental factors – Technological Environment (PE 200)
Both vessels were missing navigational lights
Organizational Influences
Organizational climate – culture (OC 200)
No safety culture – when police tried to prevent the ferry from leaving, management interfered
and told the captain to proceed.
Outside factors
Statutory - Port State (FS 000)
No sufficient enforcement powers to local police – an officer warned the captain, but he was
instructed by management to still proceed

4. MV Bassaam
Accident information sheet
Accident no.: 4
Date: 20/06/2016
Accident category: Sinking
Ship involved:
Length:

MV Bassaam

69m
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Breath:

14m

Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

Private

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

20/06/2016

Accident time:
Injuries: 20 lives lost
Casualties: 128
Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: KMA
Summary of the accident: On 20th June 2017, the vessel started her journey at Lamu Palace
with passenger lifesaving appliances on board safely locked away. Thirty minutes into the journey,
a stronger gush of wind hit the vessel and efforts to realign it to a safe speed and position failed
as the captain lost control. The vessel took in water from the bow, flooded and sunk. According
to the report, the captain did not have any formal training and certification, but had an experience
of over thirty years on sailing. From the report, there are indications that the captain did not take
into consideration the fact that from June to August season, the region is known for intermittent
rains with strong winds and rough seas. From previous records, there are higher number of
vessels capsizing in that season. The captain did not consider that and the report further says he
was ill prepared, delayed and failed to correct the vessels position to counter the strong wind and
control the vessel when she was hit by a sudden gush of wind. The vessel tripped on the fore due
to the force of the wind and took in water from the bow, further loading the vessel, gradually
exhausting the spare buoyancy and subsequently capsizing the vessel. The high number of
fatalities was contributed by lack of floatation devices. 20 lives were lost due to poor judgement
on the part of the captain, lack of life saving appliances and trading a passenger vessel in rough
seas contrary to laid down safety regulations and guidelines.
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Unsafe Acts
Violation – Routine (AV 400)
To operate a ship without proper training.
Violation – Exceptional (AV 500)
Not to provide safety instructions prior to departure.
Errors - Perceptual errors (AE 300)
Lack of situational awareness
Preconditions
Environmental factors – physical environment (PE 100)
Sudden wind forces
Personnel factors - Personal readiness (PP 200)
Lack of training
Organizational influence
Organizational climate – culture
A captain without any formal training has been employed to operate the ship

5. MV Kwale
Accident information sheet
Accident no.: 5.
Date: 11/11/2015
Accident category:

Grounding

Ship involved:

MV Kwale

Length:

75M

75

Breath:

16.05

Tonnage: 637 RT
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

Kenya Ferry Services

When the ship was taken over by the operator: 14/06/2010
Accident date:

11/11/2015

Accident time:
Injuries: several persons
Casualties: Approx. 1000
Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The standard media)
Summary of the accident: The vessel lost power in one of the generators that power the vessels
engines and stalled. This led to the vessel drifting for about 1 kilometer from the channel where it
hit a coral reef and grounded with approximately 1000 passengers on board. Several passengers
in fright jumped overboard to swim to the shore. Several persons sustained injuries from the
impact of hitting the rock. The other passengers waited for up to four hours until another ferry MV
Kilindini, Kenya Navy vessel and two tug boats were deployed to rescue the vessel and evacuate
the passengers. The vessel was refloated after the tide was high later on.

The information given about Kwale was not sufficient to code individual human factors involved
in the accident.
6.

MV Yusra

Accident no.: 6.
Date: 26/09/2011
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Accident category:

Contact

Ship involved:

MV Yusra

Length:
Breath:
Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

Private

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

26/09/2011

Accident time: 1330 hrs
Injuries: none
Casualties:
Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: (KMA)
Summary of the accident: On 26 September 2011 MV Yusra struck the end of a breakwater
while departing from Mukowe for passage to Lamu Island. The ferry’s bow was damaged but the
vessel returned to its berth without assistance. The impact resulted in several minor injuries to
passengers and crew. There was no pollution. The contact with the breakwater resulted from a
loss of directional control as Yusra turned towards the harbour’s eastern entrance. The ferry’s
engines were set to ‘full astern’ and the starboard anchor was let go, but these actions did not
prevent the ferry from running into the breakwater at 3.5kts. No announcement was made by the
coxswain to warn the passengers and crew. The loss of directional control was due to a change
in the mode the steering control system was operating. The change in steering mode was not
intentionally initiated and remains unexplained. The response of the bridge team was positive but
the action to stop the ferry was taken too late.
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Unsafe Acts
Errors - Skill based errors (AE 100)
Unintentional and unnoticed change of steering mode
Errors - Decision and judgement errors (AE 200)
Late recognition that manoeuvres are not carried out as planned
The error is not explained in the accident information. There are some actions to prevent the
accident described, but it is unclear how they were carried out. The information is not sufficient to
add further coding in respect to Preconditions for unsafe acts or other organizational factors.

7. MV Hodari
Accident no.: 7.
Date: 09/08/2013
Accident category:

Contact

Ship involved:

MV Hodari

Length:
Breath:
Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

Private

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

25/07/2013

Accident time: 1330 hrs
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Injuries: none
Casualties: 70
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: (KMA)
Summary of the accident: The passenger vessel departed Kiwayu to Lamu at 1330hrs, several
minutes into her voyage, there was total blackout on board the vessel due to power failure causing
panic to passengers. This was due to loss of power and malfunction in the engine room system

that caused a total power failure onboard the vessel. According to the report the captain had had
several such incidents and had reported to the owner for the past whole year. The vessel kept
drifting for several hours until deployed rescue boats from Marine police unit and the Kenya Navy
evacuated the passengers the following day. The incident was reported to the rescue centre 5
hours later by the owner of the vessel. All passengers were safely evacuated but the vessel ran
aground on coral rock and sank on the 27/07/2013.
The information is not sufficient to code the unsafe act leading to the accident. However, it is clear
that the engine was not fully operational at the time of the accident as several instances with
engine problems were reported during the year prior to the accident.
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors - Technical environment (PE 200)
Vessel operating with a damaged engine.
Unsafe supervision
Inadequate supervision – Shipborne and shore supervision (SI 000)
Shore based management deficiencies
Organizational influences
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200)


Owner did not react to earlier reports of engine problems



Owner reported the accident only 5 hours after it occurred
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Statutory - Flag State (FS 100)
There is no evidence of regular inspections of this vessel
8. MV. Kilindini
Accident no.: 8
Date: 09/06/2016
Accident category: Vehicle and Person overboard
Ship involved:

MV Kilindini

Length:
Breath:
Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

KFS

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

09/06/2016

Accident time:
Injuries: 1 person died
Casualties: 1
Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper, KMA
Summary of the accident: A private vehicle on board the ferry erroneously engaged its reverse
gear with the driver still inside and plunged into the sea. The vehicle slid from the ferry at Likoni
Channel. The vehicle took close to 30 minutes to sink as the occupant struggled to break out of
it. Unfortunately according to the report, there were no divers onboard and the ferry crew only
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threw a life ring to the vehicle driver even though still trapped. The vessel proceeded with its
journey across the channel. The occupant of the vehicle drowned to death after the vehicle sank.
The ferry management defended the crew for only throwing a life ring to the deceased. The ferry
operator KFS relies on volunteer divers and SAR services for other organizations like KMA,
Maritime police, Kenya navy and KPA. The operator as well does not have any specialized diving
equipment for emergency cases.
Pre-conditions
Environmental factors - Technological environment (PE 200)
Inappropriate physical barriers to prevent the car from going overboard
Personnel factors – Personal readiness (PP 200)
Inappropriate response to the accident and no support given to the struggling driver
Organizational influence
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200)
The response to the accident could be an indicator for a lacking safety culture. There do not seem
to be good emergency plans in place or any assessments made of likely accident scenarios and
how to react in such a situation.

9. MV. Likoni
Accident no.: 9
Date: 25/01/2013
Accident category: Barrier failure
Ship involved:
Length:

75

Breath:

16

MV Likoni

Tonnage:
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Build when: 2010
Build where:
Operator:

KFS

When the ship was taken over by the operator: 2010
Accident date:

25/01/2013

Accident time:
Injuries: 11 persons died
Casualties: 1000
Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The daily Nation)
Summary of the accident: While loading the vessel in Likoni Mombasa, a trailer descending the
ramp failed its breaks, lost control and caught passengers and cyclists who were already onboard
unaware and killed 11 of them and injured 20 others. Vehicles are loaded in to the ferry first before
cyclists and passengers come on board. In this case, the loaded trailer was descending the ramp
while passengers and cyclists were on board.
The information is not sufficient to code the unsafe act leading to the trailer moving into the
passenger area.
Pre-conditions
Environmental Factors - Technological environment (PE 200)
Failed breaks
Technological environment (PE 200)
In appropriate design of the ramp and the terminal to prevent such accidents
Unsafe Supervision
Supervisory violations – Shipborne violations (SV 000)
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The system was that normally the trailer should be moved on board first and thereafter
passengers and cyclists should be allowed to get on board.
It is unclear from the report if the operator or the authorities can be blamed further for allowing a
risky operation. It would require more information to allow for such coding.

10. MV Nyayo
Accident no.: 10
Date: 17/09/2016
Accident category: Engine failure
Ship involved:
Length:

75m

Breath:

16m

MV Nyayo

Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

KFS

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

17/09/2016

Accident time: 0615hrs
Injuries: none
Casualties: 1000
Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The daily Nation), KMA
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Summary of the accident: According to the report MV Nyayo was presumed not to be in a good
condition by management when the ferry operator allowed it to continue offering services due to
a breakdown of two other ferries. During that early morning, the sea was rough with current swells
and heavy rains. The ferry developed mechanical problems with over 1000 persons on board and
was swept away by the heavy tides and currents to deep sea. Tug boats from KPA secured the
vessel and towed the vessel after several reinforcements. The operator KFS‘ management
warned the passengers about the rough weather after the incident.
Unsafe act
Errors - Decision and judgement error (AE 200)
To allow for the operation of an unsuitable ferry in severe weather conditions.
Pre-conditions
Environmental factors - Technological environment (PE 200)
Unsuitable ferry
Physical environment (PE 100)
Severe weather and sea conditions
Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate supervision - Shipborne and shore supervision (SI 000)
The ship was not in good condition and this was known
Organizational
Organizational process – Oversight (OP 200)
Two ferries were already out of order
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200)
Lacking safety culture when allowing an unseaworthy ship to fill in for other ferries
Statutory - Port and Flag State (FS 100)
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No measures in place to prevent such ferry from operating

11. MV Harambee
Accident no.: 11
Date: 24/11/2015
Accident category: Mechanical failure
Ship involved:
Length:

75

Breath:

16

MV Harambee

Tonnage:
Build when:
Build where:
Operator:

KFS

When the ship was taken over by the operator:
Accident date:

24/11/2015

Accident time:
Injuries:
Casualties: 1000
Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The daily Nation), KMA
Summary of the accident: The ferry developed a mechanical problem and overshot a ramp
while trying to land on the mainland in South Coast, Likoni. According to the report the ferry was
operating despite being faulty. The report further indicated the ferry had stuck on the rump on
Mombasa Island 10 days earlier. And a week before, the management of KFS had said that the
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ferry needed urgent replacement of two engines but financial constraints had made them to
continue using the vessel.
Unsafe act
Errors - Decision and judgement error (AE 200)
To allow for the operation of an unsuitable (damaged) ferry
Pre-conditions
Environmental Factors - Technological environment (PE 200)
The ferry was defective and had known problems with engines etc.
Supervision
Inadequate supervision - Shipborne and shore based (SI 000)
The ship was not in good condition and this was known
Organizational influences
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200)
Lacking safety culture when allowing an unseaworthy ship to operate for economic reasons
Resource management - Technological resources (OR 100)
No repairs of a defective ship
Statutory - Port and Flag State (FS 100)
No measures in place to prevent such ferry from operating
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Appendix III

Ferry incident & accident pictures in Kenya

Figure: Passengers on a ferry in Likoni Mombasa
Source: Business daily(2015

Fig: A passenger vessel capsizes after colliding
with a cargo boat. Source: world bulletin (2012)

Fig: Uncontrolled number of passengers boarding ferry
Source: Baraka (2016)

Fig: A vehicle loses control and rams into a ferry
Source: The EAS (2013)

Fig: Passengers cause stampede after two ferries stall.
Source: Capital (2015)

Fig: A ferry is swept away by strong tides in
Likoni channel. Source: Daily nation (2017)
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Fig: Marine police recover a body after capsize of MV
Safina.
Source: The telegraph (2012)

Fig: Overcrowded passengers on board MV Harambee.
Source: The daily nation (2010)

Fig: Passengers disembark MV Kwale from makeshift landing after grounding.
Source: The star (2015)

Fig: Passengers in a crowded ferry in 2015
Source: Baraka (2015)

Fig: A track loading into the ferry tumbled and killed 11
people.
Source: The daily Nation (2013)
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